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
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Gordon M. Stewart is CIA's Director of Personnel.

25X6 [REDACTED] a CIA analyst, was recently commissioned to make one of a series of studies of the Agency's central reference facilities.

25X6 Davis B. McCarn is a technical advisor to the Air Force on the mathematics of weapons effects prediction.

[REDACTED] is a psychologist with several years of experience in overseas operations.

25X6 [REDACTED] is a CIA senior staff officer charged with developing new approaches to old problems.

25X6 [REDACTED] is an intelligence officer with responsibility for various aspects of covert operations.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Guy E. Coriden is the executive secretary of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges.

Amerikanskiy Turist is a reliable informant.

J. J. Bagnall is Chairman of the IAC Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X6 [REDACTED] is an analyst employed by the National Security Agency.

Stefan Borowy is the pen-name of one of the Polish Home Army officers who led the Warsaw uprising in 1944.

Myron Rush, a specialist in Soviet affairs for the Rand Corporation, is the author of *The Rise of Khrushchev*, reviewed in the Spring 1958 issue of *Studies*.

*How CIA has come to select its
general officers largely from
the ranks of its experienced
specialists.*

WHAT IS A GENERALIST?

Gordon M. Stewart

The word generalist as it is used by intelligence people has no fixed and useful meaning. It suggests a number of ideas which, for the most part, have been imported from other walks of life: from the military services we derive the concept of the general staff officer; from medicine, the general practitioner; from business, the manager; and from the world of scholarship, the synthesizer. And it must be admitted that an element of bias creeps into any discussion of generalists in intelligence. Most of us tend to line up for or against them. The result of this is that people beginning a career in intelligence have a hard time deciding upon long-range goals. They fear that the old hands will reject them if they try to become generalists and that they will run the risk of being tucked away and forgotten if they specialize. These fears, it will be seen, are largely the result of misunderstanding.

It is my purpose to describe the generalist in the light of what is known at the present time about career development in the field of intelligence. The need for qualifying this description and limiting it to the present is apparent if one turns to earlier discussions of this subject. The definitions of generalist and specialist that were current as recently as six or seven years ago must be set aside in the light of our experience, and it may be expected that our views will change in the future.

In a paper entitled "A Program for the Establishment of a Career Corps in the Central Intelligence Agency" dated 7 August 1951, the following paragraphs were written on the subject of generalists:

"Generalists are those very rare individuals who have the capacity to bring together many aspects and branches of the intelligence problem and organization, and wish to do so. Their need is not for specialized training, but for increasing areas of responsibility and experience on the one hand, and for rotational experience within the Agency, as

well as in other intelligence agencies and other governmental agencies which have mutual intelligence needs.

"Whereas the purpose of Specialist Career Training is to produce better specialists, there is considerable doubt that any particular effort should be made to improve the special skills of the generalists, excepting to broaden their language ability, increase their first-hand knowledge of important foreign areas, and to give them enough experience in the various offices of the Agency and other intelligence agencies so that they can understand their products, and know their limitations and capacities.

"Therefore, while a high percentage of this group will have benefited as specialists from . . . training . . . before they have been identified as generalists, an entirely new emphasis must subsequently be placed on their career development. The purpose of their training is to produce Directors of Central Intelligence, Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence, Assistant Directors, and Deputy Assistant Directors, Assistants to the Director, members of the National Estimates Board and other key people."

Clearly, the Agency considered making a relatively early selection of those persons who were to be developed as generalists and then planning their careers in such a way that from among their number the top management of the Agency could be drawn. The career pattern for the generalist was to be something like this: duty with Army, Navy, Air or State; rotation in CIA; assignment to ONE or OCI; rotation in CIA; National War College; assignment to the NSC; rotation in CIA; and, finally, graduate studies in the field of intelligence.

At the same time the generalist was pursuing this course of development, a carefully selected group of specialists would be developed by each of the major intelligence areas in the Agency, and it was expected from among the ablest of the specialists the top positions in these areas would eventually be filled.

These proposals for Agency personnel management were never formally adopted, partly because there was something too artificial and self-conscious about the early designation of individuals as generalists, but even more because of the pressure of work in the Agency. Since 1951 we have undoubtedly been influenced by the experience of others in the field of personnel management. The report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel dated June 1954 described the trend in management thinking as follows:

"Banks and industrial firms and commercial concerns used to develop 'generalists' for top management posts by moving promising talent through different departments. The idea was to familiarize a promising man with the different operations of a business. That practice, however, has been all but abandoned by large-scale private enterprise—first by business, not much later by the banks, and finally by universities. Prevailing management practice today emphasizes the development of an individual around his specialty, with the generalism coming later as he approaches full maturity."

The report also pointed out the great importance of bringing men of stature and experience into the Foreign Service at higher levels. Although our experience and our needs are somewhat different from those of the Foreign Service, we too have found in practice that there are two types of generalists: those who have entered intelligence work at a relatively high level and those who have first achieved status as specialists and later have become generalists.

We need devote but little attention to the former category, important as it is. Intelligence needs the infusion of new blood not just at the lower level but at the medium and higher levels. The fact that intelligence is coming of age is no reason to close the door to the great resources of talent and competence represented in industry, in the academic world and among professional people in and out of government. Further, by bringing in outstanding men from time to time, we will prevent intelligence from falling behind in those fields in which American progress is so intimately associated with the interests of national security: in science, in technology, in management and in the social sciences.

At the same time, any strong and cohesive service will necessarily try to develop a major share of its leadership from the ranks, and in intelligence this means from among its qualified specialists. To do this, it will need to convert a certain number of specialists into generalists.

Let us, therefore, begin with the specialist. The specialist, as contrasted with the apprentice or technician, is a man who has developed specialized competence and recognized standing in one or several of the broad fields of intelligence: espionage, counter-espionage, overt procurement or analysis. He is a creative worker and is, above all, reliable in the sense that he

is a known quantity. Within his field he works efficiently because he has a grasp of the factors that bear on his assignment. He deals easily with other intelligence elements, using what they can offer in the furtherance of his work. His knowledge of the intelligence process is broad and his ability to judge results in fields other than his own is at a high professional level.

The specialist may be a case officer, an analyst, a reports officer; or he may manage case officers or analysts. He may also be in charge of all of the administrative machinery associated with a substantial intelligence undertaking. Promotion to an important supervisory position is not tantamount to conversion to a generalist. Wide areas of the intelligence community are entirely dominated by the purest of specialists and it is in these areas that the most valuable work is done.

This is what makes conversion from specialist to generalist difficult. There tends to be built up among any really good group of specialists an attitude of self-satisfaction and a spirit of defense against all comers. Among intelligence people there exists the strong belief that there is no place for generalists. Are not all of us regarded as specialists by people outside of the intelligence community? Then why not fill our top positions with high-caliber specialists and let it go at that?

Harold J. Laski provided what is perhaps the best answer to this question 28 years ago in an article in *Harper's Magazine*.¹ He said that expertise sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of experience. It breeds an inability to accept new views from the very depth of its preoccupation with its own conclusions. It sees its results out of perspective by making them the center of relevance to which all other results must be related. It has, also, a certain caste-spirit about it, so that experts tend to neglect all those who do not belong to their own ranks.

If Laski had been writing about U.S. intelligence *anno* 1958, he could not have come closer to the mark. These are, indeed, the characteristics of the intelligence specialist; characteristics that many of us have long since recognized in ourselves and in our colleagues. They are the price we pay for effectiveness at the cutting edge.

¹ *Harper's Magazine*, December 1930, pp. 101-110, "The Limitations of the Expert"

But there is another side to intelligence. There are constantly at work broadening influences which over the years have left their mark on a good many men. First among them is variety. Over a period of time an intelligence officer is introduced to many of the factors bearing on national security or related to the overseas interests of the government. He has a front-row seat at the biggest show in our time. The extent and breadth of his intellectual development is limited only by his ability and willingness to learn.

Overseas, the experienced intelligence officer may be called upon to deal with men in very high positions in government, business or the professions. These relationships are not infrequently of an intense and revealing nature. They have proved to be of great value in the cultivation and growth of our people.

The structure of American clandestine activities, involving controlled competition and requiring as it frequently does the coordinate efforts of several agencies, is a permanent counterpoise to excessive parochialism and self-satisfied narrowness. It also makes a demand on the managerial skills of those who engage in joint efforts, for there are intrinsic inefficiencies to be overcome in any attempt at governmental teamwork.

Certainly the type of assignment and the type of training planned for the generalist seven years ago can provide valuable experience. These opportunities do not come in as concentrated doses as originally foreseen, but they come. Very often in making selections for the advanced schools the question of a man's ability to grow is carefully weighed, and in this sense the original purposes of the career development planning done in 1951 are kept alive.

Then, finally, in the conduct of our business it is necessary to move men from one field of specialization to another. Two elements dictate this: the shifting pressures of work and the recognized need to provide men with wide experience. This process does not, of course, operate at the rate that many would wish nor, necessarily, at the rate that it should. Intelligence has a long way to go in the development of its doctrine of manpower utilization. Nonetheless, in its few years of existence, intelligence has offered a wide variety of experience to a substantial number of men.

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What Is A Generalist?

These, then, are the broadening influences that may affect the outlook of an intelligence officer and move him in the direction of generalism. They are at work long before the question arises whether or not a given man should become a generalist. Indeed, they are in one degree or another common to the experience of all senior specialists. The final step from specialist to generalist would appear to involve a large measure of self-selection. A good number of our ablest intelligence officers remain specialists despite broad experience and outstanding success in different assignments. Those who take the step do so gradually. A man may be a practicing generalist, that is "one who devotes himself to general rather than specialist aptitudes or deeds," and yet for some time align himself with the specialists. But the change proceeds nonetheless, with the result that intelligence is constantly and imperceptibly gaining leadership from the ranks. Among these new leaders are to be found the true intelligence generalists.

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A new DCID makes timely this critical review of CIA's reference facilities with recommendations for improvements in an eventual federal system.

TOWARD A FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE MEMORY

25X6 [REDACTED]

The problem of storing an ever mounting accumulation of raw intelligence information and maintaining ready access to assorted needles in this haystack is one of the most baffling in the whole field of intelligence management. It is particularly difficult in CIA, where it is necessary to provide community-wide reference services and where no categories of data are excluded from the collection. The problem has been attacked manfully and partial solutions have been achieved; but these solutions have not kept pace with the growing mountain of documents and the sharpened requirements of intelligence analysts. CIA analysts still fall more or less frustrated between the impossibility of keeping adequate personal files and the deficiencies of the central reference service.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the central reference problem critically from the substantive end-user point of view, keeping in mind the intellectual processes and the methodological problems involved in the production of finished intelligence. This is an opportune time for such an examination in view of the new DCID 1/4 creating a permanent IAC Committee on Documentation. The new directive enlarges somewhat upon past community-wide approaches to this problem, and looks toward an integrated community system of compatible individual agency reference services—toward a unified federal intelligence Memory. The Committee will seek to develop appropriate relationships within such an integrated system, so that individual structures may function harmoniously and usefully within the framework of the whole.

The framework to be provided for the federal intelligence Memory would seem to have five theoretical functions:

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Federal Intelligence Memory

Function I: *It should integrate the information handling capabilities of all intelligence agencies and other special collections as sub-sets of a federal reference system. As a corollary of this function, and specifically to facilitate interchange and wide use of all raw intelligence information, the central framework must insure compatibility in the development of information handling systems and equipment within individual agencies.*

Function II: *It must insure that raw data from all sources, both open and classified, can easily be brought to bear selectively upon any given substantive problem. This is the basic requirement from which derive such procedural problems as how to deal with the flow of information from any particular agency or source. The function presents difficult problems in the development of adequate techniques for dealing with current unclassified literature.*

Function III: *It should insure that the central reference service is responsive to intelligence priorities, not just to frequency of demand. Factors underlying such responsiveness include the form of document storage and directness of access thereto; the techniques of search in indirect access and the resulting speed, completeness, and relevance of document retrieval; and the provision of special collections. As a corollary the central framework must provide for placement of document collections and indexing devices within IAC agencies in accordance with needs deriving from their assigned responsibilities and for the maintenance of a central all-source collection in CIA for internal and community use.*

Function IV: *It should seek to solve the problem of dealing simultaneously with several high priority requests which require the same files, equipment, or personnel.*

Function V: *It should provide for continuing consultation with users as a basis for improving procedures and should furnish oral and written guidance to users to enable them to employ the facility as effectively as possible.*

In moving from theoretical functions at this level toward more specific management problems within the Memory, there is always a danger of losing the orientation to research and substantive services in favor of procedures and approaches which facilitate internal housekeeping. The discussion which follows will attempt to retain the end-user point of view, and

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above all to keep in mind the reasoning and discriminate judgments which go into the development of intelligence products. The present analysis, however, does not get into the important related problems of formulating information requirements or of collecting and evaluating information in the field. Rather it deals with the general problem of facilitating the use of that information which has been sent to the central Memory.

*Basic Problems of Information Storage and Retrieval*¹

It is generally recognized that intelligence draws heavily on open-source information, and that the unique element in intelligence research is the careful assimilation of open-source and classified information into a timely, all-source analysis. This requires the systematic treatment of myriad incoming documents, periodicals, and books.

The intelligence reference function is differentiated from ordinary reference services primarily through its servicing of needs for classified documents. Although calls on these documents have in CIA experience constituted considerably less than half the reference requirements, the importance of classified documents to the intelligence officer and to the policy maker is inestimably greater than this proportion would indicate. Their importance derives from a substantive content not available in open sources, from their timeliness, and from the reliability of controlled sources.

The approach to handling these documents is consequently of fundamental importance in a system of information storage and retrieval, but the same logic of approach extends to incoming unclassified materials as well. In both types there are

¹ Technical note: Although this article, for simplicity's sake, frequently refers somewhat loosely to "information" storage, it actually means "document" storage. Information storage and retrieval in the technical sense applied to modern electronic computers is in use in some areas of intelligence—SAGE and some aspects of war gaming are examples—and feasible for certain others, but information storage and retrieval in this sense can never fully replace the basic raw intelligence document collections. The reasons are very complex. Suffice it for our purposes here to say that the processes for producing finished intelligence must continue to challenge the sources, to apply consistency tests to fragmentary information in the basic documents, and to apply other varying criteria in order to assess the credibility of the information and to arrange the information into ever more meaningful patterns.

three primary substantive dimensions by which they can be organized—namely, *time*, *country* (or area), and *functional content* (politics, economics, military subjects, science, etc.) In both types also there are two general difficulties which cannot be overcome completely or adequately by any simple over-all system. One is that the *full* significance of all the content elements cannot be recognized or understood, even under optimum conditions, immediately upon receipt of the document for interpretation or processing. We shall call this the Limited Immediate Recognition Problem; it is discussed further in examining indirect access techniques below. The other difficulty is that any given document may refer to numerous countries or to numerous functional fields of knowledge. This difficulty, which we shall call the Multi-Country/Multi-Function Problem, precludes the development of special collections of all relevant materials for each possible subsequent research project.

It is largely these two general problems—Limited Immediate Recognition and Multi-Country/Multi-Function—which make exclusive reliance on analyst files impossible as an over-all system and make multiple access to a central document file necessary. The Limited Immediate Recognition Problem makes *direct* substantive access to intelligently organized central files of the raw intelligence reports necessary in a system designed to insure maximum utilization of available information. With these considerations in mind let us turn to the maintenance of the federal intelligence Memory and to the three main determinants of its capability: document storage—form and logic; indirect access techniques; and supplementary capabilities and special collections.

Document Storage — Form and Logic

The central reference system, with its huge and ever increasing volume of material, is forced to use some kind of photographic reduction of the hard copy documents it receives,² one important device now in use being the aperture card which holds up to ten frames of microfilm. But photoreduction brings the user immediate and immense disadvantages: he

² The files of individual research offices, in the form of hard copy, must, because of the space they occupy if for no other reason, remain "gem" collections, rather than complete documentation over any long period. The two general problems mentioned above obviously join the conspiracy against completeness in an analyst's file.

often cannot get a recent document from the federal Memory until it has been microfilmed, mounted and coded; under some storage systems he must resort to some index device to identify and locate appropriate documents; he can look at a document only through a viewer or in re-enlargement; he cannot easily compare it with other documents. For these reasons it is clear that exclusive reliance on photoreduction in the Memory tends to restrict utilization of raw intelligence documents. An obvious way out of this difficulty is to adopt parallel hard copy and photoreduced files for the current year, while the documents are most in demand, and discard the hard copy only when it is say one year old.

The logic of the filing arrangement for raw intelligence documents is one of the most critical determinants of the federal intelligence Memory's capability, affecting as it does the amount of material concentrated for direct access by the analyst. The present arrangement of filing raw documents by central acquisition dates within their respective issuing agency series scatters through the entire document collection the associated reports from a given country. The analyst who wants one particular report and knows the issuing agency and number has immediate access to it, at least in theory; all others, whether area or functional specialists, must resort to search by one of the varieties of indirect access indexing techniques, all of which have significant limitations (see below). A filing arrangement by country of origin,³ on the other hand, with a second breakdown by issuing agency in chronological sequence, would provide direct and immediate access for country specialists and would similarly serve functional specialists in some measure, to the extent that issuing agencies specialize each in its own functional field. Certainly the current hard copy files urged above should have this arrangement, and its advantages would extend also to the photoreductions of older material unless parallel hard copy files are to be maintained indefinitely. An incidental but important characteristic of this system is

³ There are certain applications problems involving unusual characteristics of the various issuing agencies which must be worked out. The main requirements are that each reporting series be kept homogeneous, and that cables and dispatch series be kept separate. The theoretical problem can be best handled by a centrally-designed prefix numbering system covering at least three variables, agency, country (or post), and means of transmission (cable or dispatch).

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that it is open-ended and permits the addition of other classified series such as photointelligence as well as of parallel open-source series such as [REDACTED] (rearranged chronologically by country of origin), newspapers, and foreign affairs material from unclassified wire services.

This simple alteration of the primary filing arrangement would thus provide some very important substantive advantages while offering no substantive disadvantages and few if any internal housekeeping disadvantages within the Memory. The new logic largely copes with the Limited Immediate Recognition Problem by permitting, when appropriate, immediate and direct recourse to primary document files for indefinite periods by country of origin and by issuing agency. The Multi-Country/Multi-Function Problem is still with us in a large measure, however, and we shall need some other device unless we wish to rely on the analysts' experience to suggest what other country files should be looked at for a particular research project.

It is primarily to solve the Multi-Country/Multi-Function Problem, and especially to go into the myriad details of certain functional fields such as economics and the military, that indirect access techniques have been devised. It must be recognized at the outset, however, that all such efforts are impaired by the Limited Immediate Recognition Problem in a manner which cannot be fully compensated for in these indirect methods. The indirect methods, nevertheless, are necessary elements of any over-all system designed to overcome the deficiencies which cannot be removed by improving the organization of the primary document file.

Indirect Access Techniques

There are two general types of devices for indirect access: the abstract,⁴ which has its conventional meaning of a brief gen-

⁴The abstract as a form of indirect access appears to have in isolation rather limited substantive value when applied to raw intelligence documents, which frequently are sketchy, fragmentary, and disjointed. Its most important application is to unified, coherent, journal-type articles as in the Chemical Abstracts series and to finished intelligence studies. In raw intelligence report applications the abstract adds but little to the code form if the latter is applied satisfactorily. Intelligence reporting, however, probably should be standardized to provide an abstract or summary in the first paragraph.

eral summary, and what we shall call the "code form," which indicates the specific categories of information contained in the counterpart document. (These devices may be used singly or in combination, and either or both may be combined with the basic document under some sophisticated systems involving photoreduction.) Both devices can handle the Multi-Country Problem and therefore complement the proposed new file logic for document storage; and the code form is well suited to cope with certain types of detailed functional content as well. Another great advantage of the code form in application to large volumes of material is that it lends itself to machine search.

In theory, machine search rapidly works out the implications of current information-selection instructions on past document classification decisions. Machine search proper enters the process after master code categories have been established and after the content of incoming documents has been matched against these code categories. The over-all system is thus designed to permit the substantive and security classification of incoming documents on a routine basis, so that when an intelligence project is levied the substantive analyst can ideally obtain without delay (Speed Test) a group of documents comprising all those in the system which contain relevant information (Completeness Test) and no document which does not contain relevant information (Relevance Test). Unless the documents are attached to or associated with their counterpart code forms, the research analyst obtains a list of relevant document citations from which he orders retrieval⁵ from the document file. There is some tendency toward incompatibility between completeness and relevance—to assure completeness one often must risk some irrelevant documents—and sophisticated systems permit the user to lean in one direction or the other according to his project needs. The greater the number of digits in the classification code, the greater the selectivity for the research analyst and the greater the speed advantage of sorting by machine.

⁵ The Intellofax system, discussed below, combines the abstract and the code form. After machine search has been completed, a researcher then, on the basis of the counterpart abstracts, has the option of *not* retrieving some documents which machine search found to be relevant. The rationale of inserting this option is not obvious in past applications of the abstract.

Retrospective machine search systems, however, are only as effective as the external human judgments which select the pigeonholes for the incoming documents on the one hand, and as the external judgments which decide what pigeonholes to empty for the analyst's request on the other. All retrospective machine search systems, in fact, have three sensitive points—the master code, the document analysts or coders, and the search instruction writers—which limit the efficiency and reliability of recovery built into the actual searching techniques.

The Intellofax machine search system used by the CIA reference service for handling classified documents has been severely criticized on the ground that it is unreliable, unselective, and costly, and that it is incapable of providing, conveniently if at all, some important services which are desirable in a federal Memory. The unreliability and lack of selectivity stem in a large measure from lack of progress in the initial coding of incoming documents, the notable exception being the adoption of the principle of using one code throughout the intelligence community. This code, the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC), however, lacks a fundamental unifying logic, and has not been adequate to cope with the many new demands levied upon it. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the code consistently and accurately because categories have not been defined properly and given items appear in numerous places without adequate cross referencing.

To make matters worse, the organization and staffing of the document analysis sections lack specialization, balance and adequate procedures for assuring high-level analysis in the various intelligence fields. Furthermore, the search instruction writers also lack specialization, and have not been kept fully informed on the coding decisions which were being made by document analysts. Moreover, their substantive decisions on what categories of data to recall have been made unilaterally, without adequate consultation with the research analyst. As a result of these deficiencies, the really conscientious research analyst, in order to be sure he has all the available information bearing on his problem, should theoretically forego the selectivity of the six-digit code and make broad requests at about a two or three digit level; that is, he should deliberately ignore the capability of the search apparatus and use it like a conventional card file.

Vigorous efforts are now under way to develop a more flexible and better balanced machine search system, of necessity a more costly one, and especially one able to cope with the Limited Immediate Recognition Problem which plagues all indirect access techniques.⁶ But there is little point in spending huge sums of money to develop and purchase a high machine search capability if this capability cannot be utilized because of a much lower capability elsewhere in the system, namely, in coding documents or in writing search instructions. Large machine search expenditures are rational only if similar effort is made to get comparable quality in the three sensitive spots involving the concomitant human effort: the code, the coders, and the search instruction writers.

The Code. The main principle to be followed in formulating the master code for indexing document content should be to focus to the greatest extent possible on *general categories of observable data* in a manner which obviates the necessity for the coder to blur the classification process through the introduction of personal assumptions. Within the general categories the code should then go to particular sub-categories and modifiers. (Categories should be defined properly, and given data should be either treated in one place in the code rather than scattered about, or adequately cross referenced.)

The search for any general category of documents should yield, along with its family of sub-categories and modifiers, the documents of the unmodified general category for which specific sub-category identifications could not be made when they entered the system. Under this type of coding, highly selective runs would be made into a particularly relevant sub-category or modifier code for the direct evidence. But by Boolean algebraic manipulation, the research analyst can select from within the general category homogeneous categories of knowns and unknowns which bear indirectly upon a problem concerned with the particular sub-category, and this may result in further

⁶ The Minicard system, for example, combines or associates the code form with the photoreduced counterpart document. This system has not been fully tested in intelligence applications, but it appears to offer unusual flexibility in use and to facilitate the interchange of documents and code forms. As regards files, Minicard could provide the country files recommended above and still permit machine search for specifics within that logic.

identification of some unmodified general category data. Other portions of the code will have to deal with more abstract categories of data.

Centralized Community Coding. The analysis and coding of incoming documents within CIA is at present carried out in four sections which are organized to specialize on types of documents according to issuing agency and which are staffed by personnel having political science or general education backgrounds. In general, a single person analyzes a given incoming document. The analysis is usually reviewed by one other person, but there is no method for assuring that the implications of the given observable phenomenon are coded completely in all relevant functional specializations. There are no economists, military specialists, and physical scientists to recognize and identify data in these fields.

The coding sections should be regrouped, probably under the general guidance of the IAC Committee on Documentation, to provide both functional and area specialization. It is recommended that groups be organized first by functional specialization, for example a political and social section, an economics section, a military section, a physical science section, and perhaps a geography section. Within functional sections there probably should be area specialization, for example an economist for Bloc economies, one for western European economies, one for non-Bloc Asian economies, etc. Within the military section, other specialties could be introduced, for example, experts able to identify information bearing on Soviet missiles and possible missile sites. Briefings should be arranged on various subject problems, particularly those having high intelligence priority. Finally, estimates and gaps-in-intelligence reports from all major IAC research groups should be routed to and discussed within these sections.

Procedurally, every incoming raw intelligence document should be routed to each functional section for analysis, to assure competent examination for implications in all intelligence aspects. This innovation assumes that current batch handling be replaced by discrete handling of individual incoming documents. Its functional orientation could, and I think should, lead to a centralized and highly sensitive coding for the entire IAC to replace the several duplicative operations which individually have limited competence in some fields. The

coding slots could be staffed jointly by CIA and the IAC community in accordance with assigned primary responsibilities. In any case it would be profitable to have select advisory personnel from IAC agencies assigned to the functional sections on a temporary or rotational basis. All these measures serve to restrict significantly the scope in which the Limited Immediate Recognition Problem operates, but clearly they do not eliminate the problem. And, in view of this recognition problem, the general decisions not to code or to photoreduce certain types of documents—the so-called “NODEX” guides—should be carefully reviewed by community users.

Search Instruction Writing. The central reference service has also underestimated the importance of the search instruction writer. This person, usually a trained librarian but understandably insensitive to the *indirect* evidence which bears on specific research problems, is nevertheless making substantive judgments on each such problem which requires reference material, in that he determines what categories of coded data are relevant to it. If he makes this selection unilaterally, his inexpert substantive determination removes responsibility from the research analyst for further data probes. Present Intellofax procedures call for “another look” if *no* documents are recovered on the basis of the first instructions or if a *known* document is not turned up, but in the more typical cases short of these extremes there is no way of assuring that the instruction writer has ordered all or even most of the categories which the research analyst should study.

There should be a reconsideration of the question whether the formulation of the master code used by the document analyst is really adequate in the search instruction phase. Document analysis is primarily the matching problem, resembling inductive reasoning, of subsuming the document content to the master code. In search instruction writing there is primarily the deductive problem of calculating what data bear upon a given research problem. It is therefore possible that two sets of code books would be more effective, a basic one for document analysis and a cross-referenced one for search instruction. The latter might bring together code categories which usually bear upon certain typical and frequent research problems.

Search instruction writers should specialize more than at present and should undergo special training on research methods. Daily current intelligence briefings, as well as reading finished intelligence within their specializations, might be helpful to them. Procedures for keeping them informed of the coding sections' decisions on particular coding problems should receive continuing review. Above all, instruction writers should never make unilateral decisions on what categories of data to search for. The research analyst must be made more familiar with the problems of coding and should participate actively in the formulation of search instructions.

Ideally, for optimum functioning of an indirect access reference system, the research analyst himself should have coded all documents and should write the search instructions for material relevant to his immediate problem. It is only by approaching this ideal more closely, through procedures based on an improved understanding of the formidable communication and comprehension problems involved, that the cost of machine search can be justified. These considerations apply both to Intellofax and to the more complex machine systems under experimental development. (See, for example, footnote 6 above.)

Problems of Political and Military Dynamics. Machine search has its greatest potential value for those documents whose content aspects contain easily defined and recognized logical categories. Economic activities, physical country descriptions (including missile site characteristics), target information, military hard goods, order of battle, biographic information and other broad categories of data can be handled conveniently and with great rapidity by Intellofax or by some other retrospective machine search. (In line with Function II above, machine search can conveniently be extended to include unclassified material relating to selected high priority National Intelligence Objectives.) But these machine systems are inconvenient, if useful at all, for certain other information retrieval requirements.

Especially for political and military dynamics—the delicate tasks of inferring strategies, objectives, and motivations and of identifying and weighing opposing forces—there usually is no substitute for intact chronological files by country and issuing agency. In these pursuits the relevant categories of data are

not fully known, and in addition they can change frequently, perhaps with the demise of a political leader. Moreover, purely economic or purely military data sometimes later acquire critical political meaning, even if only through an implicit threat. Furthermore, there may be very indirect shreds of evidence in the raw documents which suggest new lines of inquiry or which contribute to the testing of hypotheses on the possible strategies of various factions or interests, shreds which seldom can be identified *a priori* for coding purposes but acquire meaning gradually with successive study of preceding and subsequent events. Finally, the machine search system is incomplete; certain types of documents such as FBIS, cables and Weekas are not coded.

In the field of political and military dynamics perhaps more than in others, a further deficiency of the present central reference system is a serious one—delays and gaps in the actual retrieval of documents. If it requires several days or weeks to retrieve or re-enlarge an eight- or ten-month country file, if it requires even two days to furnish prints of a hundred or so documents, if documents received in recent weeks are not made available because they are in photoreduction process, then the area analyst with an immediate need cannot be serviced by machine search, regardless of how well the material may be coded or how wisely the search instructions are written. Intelligence officers with important policy briefing functions simply cannot afford to be kept waiting while the slow, painstaking process of assembling country files takes place. The responsible country analysts must have direct and immediate access to the intact files by country, preferably in hard copy, for which this article pleads.

Supplementary Facilities

The central reference system should be a house of many mansions. It should include, in addition to its reorganized complete file of classified documents, photoreduced and coded for machine search for functional analysts, and its hard-copy file by country of current classified and open-source material for broad political analysts at a country level, a number of supplementary facilities. Some of these are represented in CIA by existing registers and special libraries. For example, the important Industrial Register provides direct access to reports

on numerous Bloc industrial installations. There should be added an improved reference assistance service with substantive competence (area and functional), somewhat analogous to the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress; a complete collection, by country, of the speeches and communiques of political leaders; area source registers; a file of FBIS dailies by country of broadcast origin; and arrangements for making revealed US policy positions on a given country available for quick reference. Finally, it is possible that for selected high priority intelligence objectives, selected unclassified material should be coded for the purpose of achieving the rapid all-source objective cited in theoretical Function II above.

Speeches, communiques, and other position papers by major political leaders theoretically are available in central reference, but access to them requires a tedious search of *NY Times*, FBIS dailies, State and CIA reports, and foreign newspapers. These materials are of such usefulness to national intelligence in showing the evolution of political leaders' public positions that special efforts should be made to make complete files by country available within CIA on a moment's notice. This service, involving routine search through relevant incoming source documents plus nominations by substantive area analysts, would result in a file similar to the present Bloc economic plans collection.

Area source registers should maintain a listing of the publications within or relating to each country, with data on the usual subjects covered in each, its orientation, apparent backers, etc. This file can borrow as appropriate from *The Political Handbook of the World* and from Library of Congress reference facilities and publications. Such a device has considerable potential for filling important data gaps, and would be useful in liaison work with other libraries.

FBIS material can be systematically included within the central reference system by a simple, inexpensive device. Existing FBIS regional dailies could be split up into countries to form new reference volumes containing the accumulation of individual country output over some months. Each new reference volume would comprise two parts, the index and the broadcasts, and each part could be set up on a day-to-day chronological basis. In this form, FBIS would parallel the proposed primary document file according to country of origin and

within that by issuing agency. Alternatively it could be bound and indexed as a book, but indexers should have an intelligence orientation.

In short, the central reference system should thus develop a combination of machine search, country files, and other features with a goal of achieving balance and flexibility. The criteria for balance and flexibility are two: the attainment of speeds of reaction which are generally consistent with the intelligence priorities of existing and foreseeable types of projects; and the maintenance of a capability of filling effectively all reasonable requests and needs which are now experienced and those which are likely to have a significant bearing on national intelligence and security within the next five to ten years. Consideration should be given to the problem of simultaneous high priority requests which make use of the same raw intelligence documents, reference personnel, or other capabilities and to the problem of making the entire community's assets available when appropriate to researchers in any of the IAC agencies.

CIA now has primary responsibility for studies looking toward the assignment of more specific and differentiated responsibilities among IAC agencies for maintaining information storage with rapid search and retrieval capabilities. It must take the lead in developing a master system to integrate the compatible assigned capabilities of other IAC agencies, as well as those of the Library of Congress and other special collections, as chambers of the federal intelligence Memory. Especial emphasis should be given to the provision and placement of information handling capabilities—realistically conceived in the perspective of the data and intellectual processes involved—to facilitate the analysis and weighing of factors which tend to upset political equilibria in countries of the Free World or to alter the strategic balance in the world situation. These capabilities certainly should have the highest information handling priorities in the intelligence community.

This review has been very critical in tone. The underlying point, however, is not that there are better reference systems elsewhere, that the existing facilities are not of considerable value, or that no progress has been made in the past few years. Rather, the point is that the international situation is moving

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into a subtle phase in which the time required to recognize new strategic and tactical developments and assess their implications will become increasingly important. The existing reference facilities are not yet good enough to meet this need.

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*In this third article of its series,
Air Targets solves for the most
elementary unknown in its
threat-vulnerability equations.*

DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING: THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODEL

Davis B. McCarn

The primary mission of air targeting is the identification of opportunities for air action. The identification of these opportunities requires an exhaustive study of many aspects of the structure of potential enemy nations. Each of the important resources of these nations must be evaluated, measured, and, if possible, associated with specific geographic locations. The contributions of these resources to the strengths of the enemy must be evaluated. The motivations and national objectives of the enemy must, in turn, be studied to determine the probable threats posed by his available strengths. Having defined the threats posed, it is then possible to return to the resources which were critical to the strengths underlying these threats and assess their vulnerability to air attack. Through the assessment of the vulnerability of many combinations of resources, opportunities for optimum air action can be identified. This analytic process, proceeding from the enemy's resources and strengths to the threats he poses and from his vulnerabilities to the opportunities they provide for air action, is what air targeting calls "comprehensive analysis."

The analytic model described in a previous issue, the Military Resources Model,¹ can be thought of primarily as an aid in the analysis of resources to determine strengths. The Air Battle Model, also described previously,² and the Damage Assessment Model, considered here, are primarily concerned with the measurement of threats and the assessment of vulnerability. Since an enemy threat can best be measured in terms of our vulnerability to it, both of these elements reduce essentially to measurements of vulnerability.

¹ *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 1958, pp. 51-64.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 2 No. 2, Spring 1958, pp. 13-32.

Vulnerability in this sense covers a wide range. In particular, it includes by inversion the time-phased capabilities of the two (or more) antagonists *in relation to each other*. The purpose of the Air Battle Model is to keep under calculation the interacting and fluctuating capabilities related to the progress of an air war. It disregards other capabilities, military, social, and economic, which do not affect the progress of the air battle. Determining the vulnerability of these remaining capabilities and strengths requires additional analysis. Basic to both the Air Battle Model and this analysis of other capabilities is an ability to predict the effects of weapons and weapon systems used by the opposing forces. The Damage Assessment Model has been developed to meet this requirement.

The Theory of Damage Assessment

"Damage assessment" as used here is limited to mean prediction of the probable effects of hypothetical applications of atomic weapons or weapon systems to specific targets or target systems. The Model is simply a body of analytic procedures which have been standardized to the point where they can either be manipulated even by people who don't understand them or fed into high-speed computers. The Damage Assessment Model is a growing body of highly flexible analytic procedures, capable of utilizing rapidly changing data with regard to atomic explosions in predicting the probable physical, functional, or operational effects of atomic weapons on targets or target systems.

In a relatively simple example, the Damage Assessment Model predicts the effects of attack on a specific airfield with an atomic weapon of given yield which is burst at a particular height. This prediction is usually in straightforward terms of physical effect, such as probable fraction of aircraft rendered inoperative, probable fraction of hangars collapsed, or residual contamination in the maintenance area after four hours. Interpretations of these physical effects may be computed, however. In this simple case, the calculation of contamination intensities, blast damage, and thermal and initial gamma radiation fluxes may be combined with intelligence or assumptions about personnel distributions and shielding to produce injury and fatality estimates. More complex cases involve functional or operational interpretations of physical effects. These inter-

pretations are important, but the basic building block for all damage assessment is the capability to predict the probable *physical effects* on targets of a projected attack.

George F. Kennan has written in a recent article in *Harpers Magazine*, "I do not believe there is any human mind or group of human minds or any calculating machine anywhere in the world which can predict with accuracy what would happen if these weapons should begin to be used. . . ." His proposition as stated is undoubtedly right. Prediction of the total effect of atomic attacks is an overwhelmingly difficult problem. Probably the most difficult part of it is the assessment of human reactions, like for example that of the doctor at Hiroshima who painted severe burns with iodine. Most of the available evidence indicates that people cannot be trained to accept catastrophe.

Even with the more limited problem of predicting the specific physical effects of atomic attack, it is not evident what physical effects should be selected for prediction. Any damage prediction presumes a prediction of the occurrence or non-occurrence of some selected type of damage. The questions asked must be of the type "Did the building collapse?" not of the type "What happened?" Determining what questions to ask is itself an abstract question requiring careful analysis.

These two aspects of the total problem, the assessment of human reactions and the selection of the physical or other effects to be predicted, are both under continuing investigation. The purpose of this article is to describe only the first step in the solution, the development of a capability to predict specific selected physical effects. This capability, which now exists in the Damage Assessment Model, has considerable importance in its own right, without regard to the solution of the larger problems. There are many problems requiring only comparative accuracy which are susceptible of solution with such a model. Questions about the advisability of using alternative weapon systems or strategies can be attacked through the computation of even arbitrarily selected physical effects to show the relative advantages of each with respect to these effects. And while prediction of the total effect of atomic attack is not possible, it is certainly possible to develop techniques for indicating the order of magnitude of some of the effects.

The Operation of the Model



The Damage Assessment Model can be divided conceptually into two parts, the first for assessing the direct effects of atomic weapons—blast, thermal radiation, and initial gamma radiation—and the second for estimating residual contamination or fallout. Of the direct effects, attention has been focused primarily on blast, and the procedures for calculating blast damage are here described in greatest detail.

The conceptual framework for the assessment of blast effects was developed from analysis of the damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Analysis of these data indicated that any system for predicting blast damage must take into account the rather awkward fact that many structures near the bomb-burst survived while structures of similar construction farther away were damaged. If a weapon were burst over an extensive housing development of uniform construction, the result might be pictured as in Figure 1. In this figure each black square indicates a building that collapsed, and each white square one that did not. It will be noted that there is no sharp line between those collapsed and those left standing.

Figure 2 shows a plot of the data on one type of structure at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The curve shown is a statistical best fit to the data; it associates with each distance a probability of occurrence for a particular type of damage. Statistical analysis of a series of such fits to data on Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicated that the probability functions for all of the various categories of structures in these two cities were remarkably similar.

If a series of these similar probability curves is drawn successively along the distance axis of Figure 2, each such curve, identified by its mean distance, can be thought of as representing a vulnerability class. These classes were assigned vulnerability numbers, VN's, and through weapons effects tests the distance range of each was translated into an equivalent range of overpressures. The VN classes thus define the probability associated with any distance or overpressure. The obvious question with regard to this last sentence is, probability of what? The answer is probability of any kind of damage, since the scale itself is a general one unrelated to any specific damage effects.

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Given a particular kind of damage, however, the overpressure associated with 50 percent probability of the occurrence of that damage can be estimated, and the probability of that damage at other overpressures can be estimated, by selecting the appropriate VN. In addition, the extensive data available from atomic tests can be used to predict the overpressure at particular distances over a wide range of weapon yields and heights of burst. Thus the assignment of a VN class to a target to define the probability of some particular type of damage allows the prediction of this probability for any weapon yield or height of burst. The selection of VN's for a variety of kinds of damage on many different types of structures and targets has been accomplished on the basis of data from the Japanese experience, atomic test data, and theoretical calculations.

The handling of thermal and gamma radiation is done with probability functions similar to those used in blast analysis. The system thus allows the prediction of any type of damage. Pre-analysis is required to determine, on the basis of the vulnerability of the target and the type of damage to be predicted, which vulnerability classification is appropriate. The model then provides for estimating the probability of this type of damage.

The technique used in estimating residual contamination is basically different from that used in the analysis of direct effects. Whereas the analysis of direct effects is based on a probability curve and results in a statement about the probability of some type of damage to a particular target, the contamination assessment model produces definite answers about absolute intensities or doses. This difference does not arise from any predictability of fallout as opposed to unpredictability of direct effects. On the contrary, it results from the difficulty of constructing a probability model of fallout; analytic effort has not succeeded in developing a probability model of fallout patterns, which depend upon unpredictable weather conditions among other factors.

Contamination analysis, however, is usually applied only to large target systems, where accuracy with respect to individual targets is less important than average estimates for the whole system. The Model allows the computation of estimated contamination levels based on a stylized contamination pattern, given the assumed weather conditions at the time of the burst,

the location of the burst, and the type and yield of the weapon. The Model provides for estimating intensities or doses at any time after the initiation of hostilities.

It may be noted that the definition of this Model does not require that it be available on a computer. The description of its two parts, one for direct effects and one for contamination assessment, is applicable to either a hand or a computerized model. The Model is available in either form. Numerous technical manuals have been prepared describing the use of these procedures in hand analysis. Programs have also been developed for several computers, mechanizing the preparation of damage assessments by the Model. The requirement for a computer program is evident from the magnitude of present targeting problems. In one recent study, roughly 1,000 high-yield weapons were gamed against a system of 40,000 targets and target areas. Thirteen hours of computer time were required to produce twelve damage answers on each target or target area, a total of nearly 500,000 predictions. A problem of this size is well beyond the capabilities of hand analysis.

The Damage Assessment Model herein described is only one of several such models which have been developed to serve this purpose. The development of a single, standardized damage assessment model is now being actively pursued in the Department of Defense. It is expected, however, that such a standardized model will adhere quite closely to the concepts illustrated in this article.

An analysis of the personal tensions which may beset an intelligence officer under official cover and lacking full contact with his intelligence organization.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN SINGLETON COVER ASSIGNMENTS

25X6 [REDACTED]

People in the intelligence business have long recognized the problem of the psychological tensions sometimes experienced by a singleton intelligence officer. In the case of the singleton who conducts covert operations from the official cover of an overseas organization, these are not infrequently so severe as to include among their manifestations an evident unproductiveness from the intelligence point of view. The man is judged by his operational supervisors to have produced less than his capabilities and cover potential would have led them to expect. He may become so involved in his cover position that he seems to have neither time nor inclination to carry out his intelligence duties. This paper seeks to identify the sources of some of these tensions.

It is evident that one of the singleton's difficulties lies in the constriction of his opportunities to communicate with other intelligence personnel: his cover is likely to isolate him to the extent that his motivation is impaired by his inability to discuss his covert activities with the base out of which he operates. What is less evident is the difficulty of psychological tensions generated by his attempt to maintain a satisfactory relationship with the members of the cover group with whom he lives and works, who may or may not have knowledge of his covert status.

There are certain psychological needs which most of us develop, in varying degrees, by virtue of the very fact that we have been reared in the American culture. Some of these have been presented in non-technical language in recent books on the subject of the American social character, for example in William A. Whyte's *The Organization Man*. The three such needs pertinent to the problem of this article are in simplified summary the following:

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Singleton Cover Assignments

As we grow up we develop specific satisfactions from being members of groups which are important to us or which we find in some way attractive. These can be formal or informal groups. Conversely, we feel concern if we are excluded from such groups. Psychologists call the need for these satisfactions "belongingness needs."

We also learn to want and enjoy the respect and recognition of others for a variety of reasons, whether for pure ability, wealth, family background, or some other superiority. This is sometimes referred to as "status need."

We set up certain standards for ourselves which we attempt to maintain; and we also set up certain goals which we strive to achieve. These are called "achievement needs."

It must not be assumed that the individual is always conscious of these needs. Indeed, at times he may be completely unaware that they are influencing his actions in a given situation. But the frustration of these needs, conscious or subconscious, is likely to produce considerable psychological tension in any person.

This frustration is not likely to occur among intelligence officers at a field station where a number of them are clustered together under the same kind of cover. Here, as at home, they are all members of a structured organization, each with his role and function as a part of the team. In addition they are generally members of the social groups which are formed from station personnel. The station organization also provides the intelligence officer the opportunity to develop his professional skills and his career under the direct observation of his operational supervisors. He can work with confidence toward promotion and other goals which he has set up for himself.

To return, however, to the singleton under official cover and his problem of unproductiveness and overinvolvement in cover activities: what are some of the influences operating on him? For one thing he may find his new cover role very pleasant. If he has been a covert employee for a number of years, without an overt employment role which relates him to the outside world, he may now find it most refreshing to be able to act as representative of a respected organization and deal comfortably with outsiders, especially the local population of the country

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in which he is stationed. A more basic reason for this over-involvement, however, this "vice consulitis," as it is sometimes called, is the closure of other avenues for satisfying his need to be accepted as a member of a group and to be respected for his performance as one of the players on a team.

It is true that he could develop personal and social relationships with his colleagues of the cover organization without throwing himself into their work, and that these should satisfy in part his need for association with a group; but the respect he receives from them will be determined not so much by personal relationships as by his ability to perform his cover duties. If he is a person with a strong psychological need for recognition of his status or achievements and if he has received this kind of recognition in the past within his own organization, he will probably devote to his cover duties whatever time and effort is necessary to achieve a like status and recognition with the cover organization, even to the extent of slighting his intelligence assignment. Such a person finds it difficult to resign himself to playing a weak or undistinguished role among his colleagues in the group with which he is immediately associated.

Even in the social groups formed from the cover organization, moreover, he may find his intelligence duties an obstacle to his and his family's acceptance as full members. These duties may require him to work evenings or to be away frequently on trips and thus may inhibit his regular participation in the rather full social life of some overseas organizations. Informal pressures may be exerted on him to conform with the normal obligations of this social life and as a result neglect certain operational activities. If his colleagues do not know about his intelligence duties, there is the additional complication of finding credible excuses and explanations.

Fortunately, some of these problems are usually obviated by informing at least part of the cover organization's staff that the intelligence officer has a special assignment in addition to his regular duties, and his colleagues often come to recognize the necessity for his irregular pattern of action. This understanding eases his social and office relationships, but by no means fulfills his need for real membership in the group and a satisfying function in the organization. He is still likely to strive, at least subconsciously, to achieve recognition in his

cover role and so devote more time and energy to it than is required to maintain the cover.

Socially, his colleagues' awareness of the nature of his other activities may be a further barrier to his, and more distressingly his wife's, being accepted as a member of the group. Many such groups have standards which reject intelligence operations as unethical activities which are in conflict with democratic and diplomatic principles. Their members, not knowing precisely what the intelligence officer is doing, imagine the worst and fear the worst, contemplating their own dreadful embarrassment if he should be exposed. The men may be antagonistic, suspecting that the intelligence officer is working at cross purposes or in competition with their own objectives. The women may make slighting comments about "people who pretend to be doing something they aren't."

If in these circumstances his contacts with other intelligence personnel and his own organization are too tenuous to compensate for exclusion from his cover group, and if he finds the cover group an attractive one, he may be forced subconsciously to accept its standards and conform to its expectations of a member. He may come to share their disapproval of illegal operations and have fear for their embarrassment—and his banishment from the group—if he should be exposed. These attitudes will of course affect unfavorably his approach to intelligence activities.

It is not implied that most, or even many, officers under lone cover become thus alienated from their intelligence mission. The point is that these unfulfilled needs are productive of unhealthy tensions in many, perhaps most, such singleton operators, tensions which act on them the more acutely in proportion to their dedication to their intelligence careers. The dedicated officer strives to maintain and improve his standing in the intelligence organization, his professional skills, and his operational production; but he does not realize how dependent he has been on the constant flow of expressed or silent approbation from his peers and supervisors until it has been choked to a trickle in infrequent meetings and messages. Even if the trickle is predominantly favorable, it may still be much less than what he is used to; and any disapprovals or divergent views, expressed or implied, are likely to become magnified in the absence of opportunity for him to present his case.

The flow of information about what's going on in the parent organization has also been choked to a trickle, information about operations and information about organizational developments. It may be difficult for him to maintain an intensive interest in operations if all his current knowledge about them has to be derived from those few he is himself conducting. And it will seem to him that his planning for his own future beyond this assignment is being done in a vacuum, out of touch with the organization.

Finally, he may suffer from tensions arising from the very multiplicity of his roles. If, for instance, he is handling four compartmentalized cases and using a different alias and cover story with each, while at the same time performing his duties as a member of the cover outfit and maintaining covert contact with his intelligence organization, he may feel himself in an unreal world which does not often permit him to be himself. The intelligence officer assigned to a station lives in a world of reality for intelligence officers; he can discuss his multiple roles and cases with other operational people and share their experiences. The singleton is cut off from this world of reality.

This article has been designed to point out and analyze a problem rather than offer a solution to it; but some of the avenues along which the solution lies can be suggested in conclusion. First, by careful selection and assessment, the most suitable type of individual for the difficult singleton assignment can be separated from those who may be predisposed to over-involvement in cover activities. If the man chosen is an "odd ball" by headquarters standards or in terms of Washington society, that does not matter so long as he is otherwise competent and will be able to derive satisfaction from his work in the singleton status. Second, supervision and guidance prior to and during the assignment can help keep the singleton's cover activities in perspective with his intelligence mission. If he likes, trusts, and respects the man who is his link with the intelligence organization the risk that these problems will arise is minimized. Third, the singleton's wife, who in some instances has a worse problem than her husband, should whenever possible be taken in and treated as a partner in the operation from its inception; and she should be psychologically supported and backstopped by women of the intelligence organization within the limits of security and feasibility.

This and the following article debate a radical solution to the problem of deinsulating intelligence officers abroad from the cultures they are sent to penetrate.

KIM OR MAJOR NORTH?

25X6

It is primarily through overseas intelligence activities that official Washington reaches out to seek an understanding of other countries and tries to meet their people on their home ground in their own cultural environment. The intelligence community is not only responsible for knowing what the people of other cultures think, but for knowing how they think and why, and for doing something about it when it is in the US national interest to influence their thinking and actions. Discharging this responsibility requires overseas personnel who have analytic, reporting, or operational ability, language skills, and the ability to live with people whose culture is radically different from the American culture.

The need for all but one of these skills is well recognized, and with much effort we are making progress toward acquiring them. The requirement for ability to live in a foreign culture, however, is not so widely understood, and we have made little progress toward acquiring it.

The American culture is in some respects an Electrolux and Old Granddad culture. We are most at ease when surrounded with the familiar and convenient amenities of American civilization. As a result, when Americans go overseas they usually try to take the material aspects of their culture with them wherever they go. In many cases they are amazingly successful—so successful that their two-year tour abroad is spent shopping at the local supermarket, watching the latest Hollywood product, and reading Mickey Spillane; and they come into contact with the local population only as they must make use of servants, cab drivers, and waiters from among the “natives.”

In another respect the American culture could be called a Good Old Joe culture. We want to be open and friendly. If we meet people who do not understand or respond to this attitude we tend to avoid them and seek associates who do. The path of least resistance abroad is to associate only with other people who are trying to be Good Joes, and by and large these will be other Americans. This natural gravitation toward our own kind reinforces the tendency to form isolated colonies and makes it doubly hard for us to meet, know and understand foreigners.

For all the hue and cry about the breaking up of homes and neglect of children the American culture is one oriented toward family life. The population statistics reveal at least one result of this preoccupation with family. Most American men in the twenty or thirty most active years of their lives are centering their energies on home-making and often are devoting a large portion of their time to household chores and child-raising. This speaks well for the vitality of the Americans as a people, but it leaves little time and no incentive for learning to live in an alien culture.

We have read a lot recently about the drive for conformity dominating American culture. There are lots of good reasons why this tendency should exist; after all, we are still assimilating many varied elements into our race and culture. But this tendency can lead us to neglect and even reject any understanding of people who do not conform to our way of life.

In addition to these natural cultural barriers, we in CIA have created a number of artificial obstacles which make it difficult for a man to live inside another culture even if he should overcome the natural barriers and make a serious effort in that direction. One could say that these obstacles are a result of the headquarters orientation of our organization and its personnel policies. We discourage association with aliens and practically prohibit marriage to them. We require conformity to American moral standards, social mores, and conventionalities of behavior in those who hold or seek key positions in Washington. The practice of rotation to headquarters and the greater opportunities of a Washington career combine to enforce these standards and conventions upon overseas personnel as well. These policies prevent our developing men who

can live inside a foreign culture. Worse, they drive away men who do want to live inside a foreign culture and attract those primarily concerned with success in the headquarters milieu.

All of these obstacles, natural or of our own making, create serious operational problems for us. It is natural for an intelligence organization to depend heavily on foreigners in its work, but our situation forces American intelligence to depend on foreigners much more and at an earlier point in the process than is desirable. It forces us to use those foreigners who are best educated and most westernized to do our own job; and these people are poor points of entry into a culture, being themselves at least partially withdrawn from it. Furthermore, our relative unfamiliarity with foreign cultures makes it hard for us to get a true reading of the people we are so using. It is hard for us to judge their reliability and motives, and hard for us to guide them in their operations, because we know so little about the context in which they must operate. In some cases we even use foreigners against third countries. This device may have virtues, but it means that we are trying to see through two cultural barriers instead of one.

The Communists do not have the difficulties in crossing cultural barriers that we do. Through their emphasis on the subordination of national, racial, and cultural differences to an international cause, the Soviets have at their disposal intelligent and trained Communists who are at home not only in West European cultures but in the Burmese, or Javanese, or Arab and can bring the Soviet influence to bear on great numbers of backward and unwesternized people throughout the world. These Communists are our strongest competition. They are the people that we must beat, and we cannot beat them from the desks of an embassy office or a consulate compound.

It is not an easy job to find people with the brains and personal skill necessary to do an intelligence job inside an alien culture who will make the effort and endure the discomfort involved. Even in the comfortable and insulated communities abroad through which we now operate, Americans and their families must go to a great deal of trouble and suffer illness and other discomfort to work overseas. What can we do to get intelligence officers to dig deeper into the world abroad?

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For one thing, the hard core of the overseas service might consist of men unburdened with family ties. It is true that if a woman is willing to make the effort she can be a great help to a man in getting to know people and aspects of foreign cultures that he might not get to know on his own, particularly in those western cultures where women are relatively emancipated. Very few American women abroad, however, have an ambition to serve in this way. Families can therefore accompany without detriment only those overseas officers who have no real need to get to know the country they live in intimately, or those few whose wives are found to have the skill and interest necessary to make the same sort of movement across the cultural barrier that we want their husbands to make. These wives should be subject to the same recruitment and training process as their husbands. The active nucleus of an overseas station should be made up of bachelors or men in a position to act like bachelors, having the freedom to move deep into the local culture and to spend most of their time in contact with the local people.

For another thing, we might encourage the development of career patterns oriented primarily toward a particular foreign area or culture. Overseas officers could be selected from personnel whose ambition is not to become a division or office chief, but to enjoy success, power, and prestige in the area or culture selected for them. They should be encouraged to "go native," devoting their energies to making a place for themselves in this culture, not burying themselves in the routine of the local American business or diplomatic community. Problems of cover would be complicated, but these problems would not be unsolvable, and the gain would be worth the extra effort.

The activities of these overseas officers should be evaluated upon their effectiveness, which will in large measure be a function of the position they carve for themselves in the local milieu, and they should not be expected to conform to American social standards and conventions. They should, it is true, be expected to maintain an objectivity of view in spite of their prolonged adoption of another culture, but a man who bridges two cultures is more likely to be objective than one who has never got outside the American way. The danger that an officer so thoroughly assimilated may develop greater sympathy and loyalty toward his adopted society than his native country

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can be forestalled by periods of leave in the United States and a system of rewards and incentives, and in extreme cases can be disposed of by modern security check techniques.

What system of rewards and incentives would attract intelligence officers to surrender for long periods their status and aspirations in American society in exchange for the dangers and discomforts of an unfamiliar one? The standard incentive is money; yet money is for spending, and spending abroad leads to the conspicuous consumption which is one of an American's greatest obstacles to crossing the cultural barrier. The assimilated intelligence officer should have access to good medical service, but no other material support which would tend to differentiate and separate him from the people with whom he must live.

The problem could be met in part by providing the major monetary reward in the form of a bonus to be collected after a fixed period of satisfactory service. The amount of the bonus might be raised considerably for each additional fixed period of satisfactory service. This would prevent the development of conspicuous consumption, but would hold an ever larger carrot before the man's nose.

Another incentive could be provided in the form of a radical change of pace. Most people can endure hardship much better if they know that at some point they will be relieved of it. These overseas officers could be rewarded with a year's vacation with pay in the United States for say every five years spent in Aden or Meshed; and this year would at the same time serve to prevent their becoming too un-Americanized at heart.

The best way to attract people with drive, however, is to provide prestige and recognition for them. At home this reward in the profession of intelligence has to be confined to a narrow circle, but intelligence officers who achieve success in another culture have by virtue of their very duties acquired prestige and recognition inside the culture they have penetrated. This prestige abroad could be augmented by the Agency in various ways tailored to each individual case. Many men would rather have fame and power among the Sikhs than obscurity in Foggy Bottom.

Aside from the concrete intelligence yield from better cultural penetration, American prestige and influence in general

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might rise drastically in many parts of the world if inside each important culture we had well-known Americans who, although obviously foreign, conformed to and participated in the customs and practices of that culture.

It is a hard job to take on a completely new way of life, but intelligence personnel have to undertake many a hard job; they can do whatever is necessary to accomplish this too. Life in any culture is really a question of learning the appropriate techniques. The techniques of staying alive and healthy in a neolithic culture are probably no more complicated than the techniques we use every day; they are only different.

Probably the key element in this problem, however, is the image of what we want to be that we carry in our minds. Being Americans, we carry first of all the image of the successful American. It may have many forms, but they are all American forms. Next, being in the profession of intelligence, we have an image of what an American intelligence officer should be. This is an image not yet fully matured, because we are still internes at the profession. The chances are that at the present stage of development this image is closer to that American superboy of fiction, Major North, than it is to Kipling's Kim. Let us be careful that as we develop this image we make it that of a brave and energetic man who can move freely in non-American society. Let us not make it the image of an expatriate bureaucrat.

NEW ANACHRONISM

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There can be no quarrel with the charge in the foregoing article that Americans generally, and some intelligence personnel as well, tend to transport their homes abroad along with their baggage, consort with other Americans to the near exclusion of foreigners, attend Hollywood films in Bond Bros. suits, etc. Nor can there be any doubt that the insularity of some intelligence officers creates grave disadvantages. Mr. Tidwell's proposals, however, carry within them problems quite as grave as those he seeks to solve.

First, it must be assumed that the writer is speaking of staff employees rather than contract personnel. The "outside man" under unofficial cover is in many places abroad close to the local population. If the article's admonitions are intended for him, they will have for him none of the stimulus of a new idea. Personnel under official cover, on the other hand, cannot follow a pattern of conduct conspicuously different from that of their colleagues in the cover organization without attracting the attention not only of those colleagues but of local services as well.

The basic objection to admonishing all our people abroad, or as many as possible, to adopt any one line of conduct is that the admonition is Procrustean. Our intelligence officers are individuals. Our task is to see that each man knows his strengths and weaknesses and, both for the organization's sake and his own, exploits the former and guards against the latter. The question, "How should intelligence officers act?" is wrong *per se*. The right question is, "How should *this* officer act?"

The Richard Halliburton type of intelligence officer became obsolescent before World War I and obsolete thereafter because this century has witnessed a marked increase in the sophistication and skill of counterintelligence in many nations. It is no longer possible, with the aid of Max Factor's makeup kit and a soiled burnoose, to slip shadow-like among the Arabs and ferret out their plots. The cop wants to see the ID Card; and if it isn't backstopped—as it won't be unless the purpose of the

deception has been defeated at the outset—then our hero's troubles are even blacker. The only way in which we can learn about Arab plots today is to ask Arabs.

In some areas the appeal of Americans is their Americanism. For years after the war—and perhaps even now—Germans, for example, viewed with a narrow eye those Americans who spoke their tongue too glibly and followed their conventions too automatically. They suspected such Americans of being Jews who had fled Germany in the thirties and returned to employ official power for personal revenge and benefit. Most people, even citizens of rather hostile governments, like and are willing to help the foreigner whose efforts to learn their language and history are as sincere as they are naive. But this pleasant atmosphere may vanish if the American is suspiciously sophisticated. Here too, the point is not that some foreigners will not be deeply impressed by a sophisticated assimilation of their culture. The point is that a uniform mode of conduct would be wrong in concept not only because intelligence officers are individuals but also because potential agents are individuals.

The security risks intrinsic in [redacted] recommended behavior-pattern are precisely those which are likeliest to remain invisible to the devil-may-care, bash-on-regardless hero most apt to act upon the recommendation. A study of the provocation techniques employed against us in Hungary and elsewhere makes it plain that the disadvantage of an English-Russian dictionary with curves is that she is very likely to be a Russian-English dictionary as well. Of course it may be very useful for an intelligence officer to establish intimacy with a foreign woman. But before he does so, he not only name-traces her but also submits his operational plan for approval. However wide-spread his contacts should be, they must remain thoroughly discriminate. The officer who followed whole-heartedly the spirit of [redacted] advice would probably find himself well tiddled. He would not only lose the cover over him; he'd also find nothing between him and the cold, cold ground but one thin native girl.

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The intelligence community's response to the mushroom growth of Soviet technical literature is impressive in its coordination and thoroughness.

THE EXPLOITATION OF RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

J. J. Bagnall

Russian scientific literature has been an object of the intelligence community's attention for the past ten years and more. Even before the end of World War II, US intelligence had assigned some priority to the examination of Soviet documents. Army intelligence had established its Special Documents Section to collect information on the USSR from captured documents in both the Russian and German languages. Although not abundant in these sources, a good deal of information on Soviet military technical developments was ferreted out. The Washington Document Center, jointly operated by the Army and Navy, similarly searched captured Japanese documents for Russian scientific and technical developments.

Development of the Program

As the examination of captured documents passed its peak of usefulness, when it no longer filled the need for information on current scientific developments in the USSR, the CIA components which had taken over this wartime activity turned to current Soviet scientific and technical literature. They did not find such a wealth of information as has now become available, but still a surprising amount on scientific research in progress, if virtually nothing on its technical application. As the number of journals was small and procurement rather erratic because of Soviet censorship, it was decided to abstract all articles and then translate in full certain ones needed by the community. This procedure, begun in August 1947, continued for almost nine years to April 1956.

Between 1952 and 1954 the Soviets began to release more scientific literature; whereas in 1952 only 87 journals were

available, by 1954 there were 165. The Air Force, taking note of this and desiring to have as much of the literature abstracted as possible, set up with CIA a joint program for abstracting cover-to-cover 58 selected journals of prime intelligence interest. This program also continued until April 1956.

By this time the number of scientific journals released by the Soviet Union had increased to 328, and the intelligence community took a closer and harder look at the increasing amount of material available. Information was beginning to appear on Soviet research and development in, or related to, the fields of atomic energy, guided missiles, electronics, automation and ABC warfare. There were now far more than 58 journals of prime interest. There was no question of the value of the information to intelligence; the problem was how best to handle it in order to serve the varying needs and analytical facilities of the several agencies.

Two separate methods evolved. The Air Force felt a compelling need to continue and expand a cover-to-cover abstracting program, and therefore proceeded on its own to increase the abstracts coverage gradually, more than doubling the number of journals regarded as of major departmental interest.

Other members of the community, lacking the facilities to sort and maintain files for tens of thousands of abstract cards per year, wanted a screening process performed. Accordingly, in April 1956, CIA began issuing twice a month, as a service of common concern, a digest of information. This sizable report sought to cover the entire range of Soviet Bloc scientific literature, sifting out all research reports of high intelligence priority and also providing news-type items about personnel, organizations and activities in all scientific fields.

Although these efforts have focused on scientific journals as the best source of current information, books have not been overlooked. In 1953 the Air Force began the abstracting of Russian scientific books received in the Library of Congress and continues this program today.

The Current Effort

The foregoing historical sketch has traced the growth of interest and activity on the part of US intelligence in the exploitation of Soviet scientific literature, providing a background for correction of the misleading and erroneous publicity in the

US press on the subject following the advent of Sputnik. How does the picture look today, and how is intelligence being provided with information from this source?

Russian literature of scientific interest is available today in approximately 325 journals specifically devoted to scientific fields, another 75 partially occupied with items of scientific concern, and about 80 additional periodicals of a bibliographic nature in the scientific and technical fields. Of books and monographs there are approximately 3,000 per year available. In addition, two newspapers devote regular coverage to fields of science and technology.

The Air Force is abstracting all articles in 137 of the journals. These abstracts are issued in card form and disseminated to the intelligence community. The Air Force also prepares reviews of books received and available in the Library of Congress. Meanwhile, CIA is producing two digests in the scientific field. One, entitled *Scientific Information Report*, has the objective of providing condensed information, whether in summary, extract or abstract form, on subjects of highest priority interest to intelligence. This report, issued twice monthly, is the product of a complete screening of all Soviet scientific periodicals. The other CIA digest is a compilation of items on International Geophysical Year activities. Because of the sensitivity of intelligence interest in IGY information, the report is issued under Commerce Department cover.

These operations carried on within the intelligence community are specifically designed to serve intelligence purposes. However, some activities not so designed, and carried on outside the intelligence community, also produce information which can serve intelligence needs. The intelligence operations described above were therefore developed with cognizance of these others and with a view to making maximum use of them and avoiding duplication.

For bibliographic and indexing service there is first the Library of Congress' *Monthly Index of Russian Accessions* (MIRA). This publication gives the titles of all articles and books received. It is the bibliographic guide to all Soviet literature, including scientific and technical items. In addition, two other libraries—the National Library of Medicine and the Agriculture Library—issue bibliographies which include the

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Russian Scientific Literature

Russian literature in their respective fields; they overlap with the MIRA listings. All three publications are widely available.

There are also several specialized indexes. One in the Agriculture Department Library covers the field of veterinary medicine. This is in card files and not disseminated. Another, in CIA, indexes in card-file form information from Soviet literature on scientific institutions in the USSR. In addition, the abstracting services cited below usually provide indexes to the literature they have abstracted.

Abstracting is the most popular approach to scientific literature, and there are numerous professional abstracting societies. Among the best known are Chemical Abstracts, Excerpta Medica and Biological Abstracts. These professional organizations publish abstracts each in its own field, usually with a lag of six to eighteen months from the publication date of the original source material. In addition, the Joint Publications Research Service has begun issuing translations of the abstracts produced by the Soviets themselves and published in their abstract journal *Referativnyi Zhurnal*. These are abstracts of their own literature. The three series being translated are chemistry, physics and biology.

With respect to translation, a rather extensive program of cover-to-cover translation covering some 30 to 40 journals is sponsored by the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, and this is supplemented by work undertaken by commercial translating agencies. Translation of specific articles is sponsored by a wide range of agencies and organizations, and a complete monthly listing is issued by CIA in its *Consolidated Translation Survey*.

In summary, now, what does intelligence have as a result of this program? First, it has a complete listing and index of the titles of all Soviet books and journal articles received in this country. Second, it has a digest of all journal information on research related to the high priority objectives of atomic energy, guided missiles, ABC warfare and electronics, as well as all news about Soviet scientific organizations, personalities and activities. Third, it has a review of each book or monograph on a scientific or technical subject. Fourth, it has rather prompt abstracts of all articles in the most important journals. Fifth, it has abstracts excellently prepared by the

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Soviets themselves on their own research in the fields of chemistry, biology, and physics. Sixth, it has a fairly large volume of translations of individual articles selected on the basis of particular interest. At longer range there are available abstracts prepared by the professional societies in their subject fields, as well as cover-to-cover journal translations and collations of material in special subject categories.

Intelligence then has available for analysis and evaluation a broad selection of the important information on Soviet science obtainable from the literature. It does not, of course, have an abstract of every article nor a translation of every article. But that is hardly necessary or even advisable. Translating every piece of scientific literature put out by the USSR would fill an estimated 1,500,000 pages per year at a cost of over six million dollars, provided a sufficient number of linguists could be found to do the job. The analytic handling of such an indiscriminate mass of material would be next to impossible.

What we need and what we now have is a good alerting and screening mechanism for the exploitation of Russian scientific literature. This does not mean that every little kink has been worked out of the system nor that the intelligence community will sit back in complacency. At the moment, for example, investigations are being conducted on the feasibility of obtaining data on the guided missile industry in the Soviet Union by collation of fragmentary bits of information scattered through the literature in not obviously related fields. In its coordinated attack on these problems, the community will continue to monitor, through its interdepartmental Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, changes in Soviet practices in releasing information through open literature, indeed trying to anticipate them, and accordingly will take joint action to revise as necessary the system of exploitation or its procedures.

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A member of the responsible IAC staff makes a comparative evaluation, from the intelligence viewpoint, of mechanisms for the control of East-West exchange visits.

THE INTELLIGENCE HAND IN EAST-WEST EXCHANGE VISITS

Guy E. Coriden

Exchange visits with the Soviet Bloc have now become a prominent feature of East-West relationships. Such visits have been lauded by both Eastern and Western statesmen as an ideal method for bringing the peoples into contact and thereby lessening world tensions. Scientists have said that the free interchange which is provided by direct contact is essential if man is to make maximum progress in his battle to conquer nature and the elements. Men of good will have reiterated the necessity for peoples of the world to know each other and to share the gifts they possess with those who are in need of them. Last, and maybe least from any point of view except that of this community, exchanges have been considered as vehicles for the collection of foreign positive intelligence.

It is clear that many different agencies and interests must be involved in the planning of exchanges. While the aims of these different interests are not necessarily incompatible, it sometimes seems that they are, especially to those attempting to reconcile the views of the many participants. In organizing specific exchanges one finds that in addition to group interests each individual involved seems to have his own axe to grind. The US citizen playing host to Soviet citizens may be using Soviet attendance to increase the attractiveness of his conference, may have a financial profit motive, may be attacking the problem of East-West enmity in his own personal way, or may just wish to show off his plant or university to a Soviet acquaintance he met at a European conference. The US citizen visiting the USSR has an additional motive, the desire to see for himself just how the two countries compare. After we have loaded on all the personal aims and hopes, the exchange

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must pass through the channels of Government, where it encounters the cross-currents of other purposes. Among these are intelligence collection, technical gain, propaganda objectives, internal security, interagency rivalries, and national policy.

Some semblance of this maze of complications must face those in any nation who are attempting to organize exchanges. This community's professional objective is to derive from them a maximum intelligence yield consistent with national policy objectives. A comparison, from the viewpoint of this objective, of the different methods and mechanisms used by different countries for carrying out exchange programs may be useful to us. This article will review the procedures in use in four countries: the United States, where we who are involved in the program know it at first hand; the UK and Canada, where we know the procedure pretty well through friendly liaison; and the USSR, where we only guess at the set-up on the basis of our experience with the other three countries.

The US Program

In the United States, the principle of a US-USSR exchange visits program has been indorsed at the highest levels. The President introduced the principle at the 1955 Geneva Conference and has spoken favorably of the program many times since. There is a National Security Council directive, NSC #5607, which instructs the Secretary of State to carry out the program. Pursuant to this administration policy the Department of State has established a Special Assistant to the Secretary for East-West Contacts and an East-West Contacts Staff (EWC) under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. EWC uses an informal interagency panel to keep other offices of the Department and other interested Government agencies informed of developments, and the opinions and recommendations of these agencies are in turn funneled back through the panel members.

The intelligence community has established the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges as a forum for intelligence views on exchange matters. Because only the intelligence community concerns itself with *all* scientific, technical, and economic information from the Soviet Bloc, this IAC Committee can be considered the logical place in the US Government to weigh

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the possibilities of a gain to the United States from a technical and intelligence point of view. The Department of State, of course, must weigh any intelligence consideration together with policy and propaganda considerations and arrive at a final decision concerning a specific exchange.

Administration policy calls for extracting reciprocity from the Soviet Union for any privileges accorded in connection with the exchange program. It is through this reciprocity that we hope to arrange tours to installations and areas of the USSR previously unvisited; and the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges endeavors to provide continuing support to EWC in applying this policy during the course of negotiations on exchanges. It is evident that the hard insistence on reciprocity has hampered the Soviets. While it has not forced them to open the door wide, it has revealed their sensitivity regarding certain areas and has given us access to previously unvisited installations. On the other hand, EWC is hampered in its effort to extract the maximum privilege by reciprocity because Government funds are not available to guarantee that a negotiated exchange will be carried out.

Since not only the US and Soviet Governments, but also private US citizens originate exchanges, EWC has some problem with those who, proceeding from newspaper accounts of an open exchange policy, make elaborate arrangements for entertaining Soviet visitors in the United States without considering either the principle of reciprocity or the possibility that other negotiations might be going on for exchange visits in the same field of interest. As the policy of the Government toward reciprocity has become more widely known, however, it has been complemented by a desire on the part of US private bidders for Soviet visits to make visits to the USSR themselves. The Soviets have involuntarily assisted in selling the reciprocity principle to US citizens by their apparent inability to provide return invitations and other social amenities which contribute to a smooth program and friendly visits.

In an added effort to obtain information compensating for the vast store of knowledge about the United States which the USSR has at its disposal because of our freedom of publication, the Department negotiated an extensive exchange agreement on 27 January 1958. This agreement covered some aspect of all technical, educational, cultural, athletic, scientific, and gov-

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ernmental fields. It provided a working base for developing a successful exchange program, but was not intended as a maximum limit. By suggesting appropriate additions to this agreement, the United States has now developed a schedule of exchanges which promises to give us at least an even break from all viewpoints. Because in a democratic system control over the actions of private citizens cannot be complete, the development of the program has required a good deal of careful handling. The procedure has been to give advice and consultation to the many US citizens involved through EWC, as the designated Government entity, and to make it a focus for the responsible opinions of the Government agencies concerned.

The Canadian Procedure

The Canadian Government approaches the Exchange Program in a different way. Deputy Ministers from its various interested departments constitute a Visits Panel, which considers Soviet proposals and Canadian proposals to the USSR. The Chairman of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee is a member of the Panel and the focal point for intelligence influence on the exchange program. He presents the opinion of the JIC, which reviews proposed exchanges at its regular meetings and is expected to propose desirable new areas of exchange. The Canadian Government has not, however, attempted to funnel all exchange activities into Government channels, and the Soviets have therefore been successful in end-running the Government in many cases. The Ministry of External Affairs is careful *not* to advise Canadian citizens as to their course of action when approached by the Soviets with an exchange proposal. The intelligence community does provide advice to private citizens in certain selected cases, but it has no effective method of preventing Soviet negotiation of a private exchange when the demands imposed by the Government for an official one become too onerous. The Canadians have, to be sure, obtained some valuable intelligence through the guided efforts of some private citizens, but they have not been able to arrange exchanges in any of the fields of priority interest established by the Government. The Canadian tradition of party responsibility enables them to focus the Government end of their programs effectively, but lack of the closed areas and other control devices available to the US makes it unfeasible to control other aspects in such a way that the net

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advantage to Canada is a consideration in each case and in the total program.

The British Approach

The British, in the early days of the exchange program, had to contend with the fact that active Soviet Friendship Societies were eager to cooperate with the USSR in arranging exchanges, exchanges which would of course be shaped to the propaganda advantage, at least, of the Soviet Union. The British answer was to establish the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council. This Committee, composed of Members of Parliament, Government officials, and private citizens, has the responsibility and funds for negotiating and carrying out an elaborate exchange program. The Soviet Government is on notice that all exchange activities are to be handled by this Committee, which because of its standing and financial means has been eminently successful.

From all accounts, however, the voice of intelligence in planning the British program has been weak in comparison with its influence in the US and Canadian programs. This does not mean that it has not produced substantial information; the intelligence community has participated in planning and executing some of the technical exchanges. There is, however, no mechanism for bringing intelligence initiative to bear on the shaping of the program or for effecting exchanges which are of particular interest to the intelligence community. It is only because the Soviets are interested in some of the subjects which are also of critical British intelligence interest that valuable exchanges have been proposed and carried out. Neither have the British sought to negotiate itineraries in an effort to penetrate or feel out the sensitive points in the Soviet technical fields. The mechanism of the Council, however, with its control of funds has been relatively effective in securing the cooperation of the British people and all elements in the Government.

Soviet Practices

The USSR approaches the program in the entirely different way made possible by its totalitarian control, which enables it to present a single face to the world and issue a single invitation concerning any subject exchange. It also has a clear aim of technical and propaganda gain for its program. It is hampered in negotiations, however, by some evident internal dis-

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agreements over methods and by the complexity of its bureaucracy.

The location of the real focus of the exchange effort in the USSR is not known. The Soviet Academy of Sciences is the front for the scientific exchange effort, and the other special ministries handle cultural exchanges. Most technical exchange proposals are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is strong evidence that individual Soviet citizens who have answered or extended invitations without consulting some proper authority have done so to their detriment. There is also ample evidence that delegates participating in official exchanges have been chosen for the usefulness of their abilities without regard to their personal desires to make the trip. One Soviet scientist reported to a friendly US interpreter that he had arrived in Moscow in response to a summons without so much as a toothbrush in hand. He was instructed to acquire the necessary equipment to enable him to spend three weeks in the United States beginning the next morning.

On the minus side, the prolongation of itinerary negotiations for as much as six months in some cases indicates that the conflict in the USSR between those desiring technical gain and those concerned with internal security is more of a problem than it is in any of the Western countries. The continued statements warning Soviet citizens about free interchange of information with Western visitors, coupled with the insistence that Soviet delegations bring their own interpreters, leads one to believe that the USSR is concerned about the amount of information seeping out from under the Curtain. The evidence also suggests that the Soviets, like the Western countries, do not consider their exchange program to be completely successful. Their continued efforts to arrange long-term exchanges in the fields of most interest to them shows that they have not yet harvested the amount of technical knowledge they desire. These negative features, however, do not indicate that the Soviets have not made technical gains or have provided us with startling amounts of information. There is evidence to show that the visits have brought home to them some Western technical methods which should have been at their disposal from their thorough coverage of Western literature but apparently required personal experience to be accepted and assimilated.

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When faced with stiff reciprocal proposals, the Soviets have changed tactics several times in their apparent effort to obtain a net technical gain by getting many Soviet specialists intensively exposed to advanced US installations. Originally they suggested straight exchanges with only loose agreement on itineraries, apparently hoping that they would be able to plan their own visit on the scene while limiting US access to their installations by heavy social schedules and a very well guided tour. When resistance was encountered, they sought attendance at conferences in the United States, attempting to arrange tours following the conferences in exchange for treks down the same worn paths in the USSR. The next tactic was the long-term (three to six months) exchange; this was quietly abandoned, at least for the moment, when fields other than those named by them were counterproposed. The current gimmick seems to be an effort to catch us off balance by partial agreement to one of our counterproposals at the last minute after long amicable negotiations; the concession calls for US agreement to something less than we requested, if elaborate plans are not to be discarded.

These tactical maneuvers are not nearly as clear as they appear in the telling, and perhaps not as deliberate. Their description is distilled from a vatful of experience which leaves unexplained in the residue a number of spurned nonreciprocal requests in key fields, projects abandoned without explanation after frenzied effort, and visits to key places on a free basis refused. But it seems safe to say that the Soviet exchange visits group has not reached its goal and has not so far mustered the assets to do so.

Comparative Evaluation

The process in each of the four countries, with its composite of aims, attitudes, and mechanisms, has some advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the intelligence collector. The Canadian system assures that all the facts will be weighed at a policy level with a minimum chance for misunderstanding, and it gives strong play to intelligence initiative. The British approach provides a cornerstone for the national program and financial stability for any effort undertaken. The Soviet system has the advantage of a clear aim and unlimited resources. This advantage is offset to a substantial degree by an unwill-

East-West Exchange Visits

ingness to allow visits to trouble spots even to secure desired ends and by the apparent fact that internal security forces have the upper hand and can frustrate efforts to gain technical knowledge. The wholehearted cooperation among agencies in the US program enables the intelligence community to plan for penetration of targets in the USSR in the expectation of exploiting the full extent of Soviet willingness to pay for technical familiarization. The lack of US financial support and the strong influence of private aims incongruent with the intelligence plan are offsetting factors. Although in our struggle with these problems we sometimes look with envy at our opposite numbers in the other countries, our own advantages seem on balance just a little greater than theirs.

*A sophisticated tourist describes
how he casually probed weak
spots in the Iron Curtain.*

A NOTE ON CASUAL INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION

Amerikanskiy Turist

"Your pass, please," crisply asked the guard. "Oh, the Devil! I left it home." With a gesture of annoyance tempered by indifference, the guard motioned me into the Frunze Soviet Army Club in Moscow. And so I wandered around and cased the place. The auditorium was ultramodern, well equipped for several hundred guests. The luxury of the surroundings for the senior and field-grade officer class which frequents this elite officers' club was evident in the mosaic murals and paintings depicting in warm colors the past battles of the Red Army. No secrets lying about—but a laxity on the part of the guard reflecting his assumption that, after all, no unauthorized Soviet citizen would *try* to get in.

So, too, in Tbilisi. When as a visitor from Moscow I inquired about a place I could relax in the evening, other than the restaurants or one pseudo-nightclub, someone mentioned the Voroshilov Club, down almost next to the Staff of the Transcaucasian Military District. So I sauntered into the Voroshilov Club, and was asked for my *bilet*. Surprised that a ticket would be required, I asked where to get one. When my inquiry was met with incomprehension, I adopted what I had observed to be a Soviet technique for overcoming perplexity, and began shouting I had a right to enter. Again, a shrug of the shoulders and I went in. Only later did I realize that the club was exclusively for Party members, and the attendant had been asking for my Party card (the Russian word being identical with that for a ticket)! In this case I was evidently taken as a visiting Czech or East German Communist.

But the greatest opportunities for casual intelligence collection may occur in places where no subterfuge is required to gain access. By cultivating a young lady working in a second-hand bookstore in Moscow, for example, I obtained a *classified* five-volume Soviet history of the Soviet-German campaigns of 1941-1945 prepared at the Frunze Military Academy (Com-

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Casual Intelligence Acquisition

mand and Staff College), which a negligent Soviet officer, or perhaps his widow, had left in a group of books sold to an undiscerning bookseller. This work, much more comprehensive than any previously known to exist, is based on materials from *Military Thought* (the confidential theoretical military journal, published by a section of the General Staff for senior Soviet officers), unpublished war college lectures, and material from archives. It was written by a number of generals and colonels.

The military bookstores form a separate system of stores under the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, with branches in the dozen or so main cities. I visited some half dozen of these, and obtained various open publications (the artillery manual, internal service regulations, disciplinary regulations, etc.) and some factory and office civil defense posters. But in Leningrad, by exceptional chance—and by flashing a Soviet officer's identification card-holder I had picked up elsewhere, in a provincial military store—I bought another (1956) classified history of the recent war, and another study, put out by the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff (National War College). This study, like the Frunze Academy series, had not previously even been known to exist.

These incidents illustrate the opportunities created by the difficulty Soviet citizens have in recognizing Russian-speaking foreigners (unless, of course, their dress is too evidently Western). On a number of occasions, after dealing at some length with a Soviet citizen, I have casually admitted the fact (which I had never done anything to conceal) that I was an American; and it came as an obvious surprise to them.

It is no news to any intelligence officer that libraries continue to be a useful source of intelligence. In the Soviet Union they are often most useful in indicating categories of items *not* available on security (or political) grounds. In some libraries, by filling out the forms required (including the notation "non-Party" in respect to Party status) and submitting one's passport to negligent inspection, it is possible to get a regular library pass to consult some areas in history and military affairs, for example, which are not open to all. The most useful library I found, however was the Fundamental Library of the Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences, where I filled out no forms, did not identify myself except as a foreign

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scholar, and yet obtained access to files including unpublished dissertations, political instructions in the armed forces, etc.

Security on military matters including ordnance—leaving aside the separate matter of airfields and field installations—is sometimes mildly compromised at the military museums. In the Frunze Aviation and Civil Defense Museum I was able to buffalo the attendants into allowing me to take flash color photographs of the engine of the TU-104 and certain other items which the US Air Attache's office had been denied permission to take. When as a foreign tourist I asked if it was permitted to take photographs, I was told, "In general, no." After arguing not "in general" but in particular (Why not? Of course if they were ashamed to have a foreigner take interest in their technological level . . .), I was finally granted permission. Similarly, at the Zhukovsky Aviation Section located at the Central Aerodynamics Institute, I succeeded in photographing scale models of various Soviet aircraft, including one prototype (identified even as to model) which we had never before seen! At the Naval Museum I was able to see, but unfortunately not to obtain (as it was secured under glass) the April 1957 "Instructions of the Central Committee to the Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy," a document unpublished and, I believe, not yet in our possession.

My purpose in describing these incidents is to illustrate the little appreciated possibilities for casual intelligence collection by prepared travelers, aside from such routine opportunities as conversations with Soviet citizens and direct observation of installations encountered. Some of these opportunities are denied to attaches (e.g., photography in the Air Museums) but some of them can be exploited even by official representatives (e.g., coverage of second-hand bookstores to secure classified or rare published Soviet materials).

These and other techniques of casual intelligence acquisition can of course only supplement covert collection operations; but they have the advantage of legality. Some of them do require pseudo-impersonation and pseudo-naivete, and some require that the subject not be under surveillance at the time. Most of them require, in addition to knowledge of Russian, a detailed specific awareness of possible targets, that is, knowledge of requirements, of what is and is not already available, and of the location of institutions not publicly identified and

other such places. Often it is purely a matter of exploiting unpredictable potentialities, but these too can better be seized upon if examples are previously available.

This discussion does not pretend either to open an entirely new field nor to do more than note a few aspects of the subject. It is offered merely as an individual's observations on the unexhausted field of casual intelligence collection, based upon recent experience while traveling as a tourist in the U.S.S.R.

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The story of a critical intelligence finding almost unrecorded in the history of French intervention in Mexico during and after the Civil War is reconstructed here from official records in the National Archives.

A CABLE FROM NAPOLEON

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The years 1864-67 saw the United States facing one of the severest international problems in its history: an Austrian prince ruled Mexico and a French army occupied the south bank of the Rio Grande. It was toward the end of this period that the Atlantic cable went into permanent operation. Thus the United States had both the motive and the means for what was almost certainly its first essay in peacetime communications intelligence.¹

The nation had emerged from the Civil War possessing a respectable intelligence capability. Union espionage activities were generally successful, especially in the later stages of the war; Northern communications men read Confederate messages with considerable regularity (and received reciprocal treatment of their own traffic from the rebel signalmen); and there were intelligence staffs that developed a high degree of competence in digesting and reporting these findings.²

¹ No earlier use of communications intelligence by the United States in peacetime is known to the writer. Any reader who knows of one is urged to present it.

² At the beginning of the war the government's conception of military intelligence work was so limited that it employed Allan Pinkerton, by that time well known as the head of a successful detective agency, as the chief intelligence operative in Washington. Pinkerton proved effective in counterintelligence work, but his intelligence estimates so greatly exaggerated Confederate strength that he is commonly given a large share of the blame for the supercaution that caused his sponsor, General McClellan, to stay close to Washington with far superior forces. Pinkerton left the service with McClellan in 1862, however, and long before the end of the war competent intelligence staffs, entirely military in character though composed of men drawn from civil life, served the principal headquarters.

With the war over in 1865, this new capability was turned against Napoleon III and his puppet, Emperor Maximilian of Mexico. In the struggle to get the French army out of North America and Maximilian off his throne, this government had the use of an intelligence enterprise which, though conducted on a small scale, turned out to be very effective. Up to the last weeks this intelligence operation consisted of competent reporting on the part of espionage agents and diplomatic representatives; but when a crisis developed at that point, these sources were silent, and it was a cablegram from Napoleon to his commanders in Mexico that yielded the information needed by the nation's leaders.

As an intelligence coup the interception and reading of this message were hardly spectacular, for it passed over fifteen hundred miles of telegraph wire accessible to United States forces and, contrary to later assertions that it had to be deciphered, it appears to have been sent in the clear. Nevertheless, the event was an outstanding one in the history of United States intelligence operations, not simply because it represented a beginning in a new field but also because the message in question was of crucial importance.

State of the Union, 1861-65

The crisis in which America's intelligence capability asserted itself did not come until after the nation had spent five anxious years watching the European threat develop.

Napoleon had sent an army to Mexico late in 1861, assertedly to compel the payment of huge debts owed by the government of Mexico. His object, however, was not simply a financial one: a new commander whom he sent to Mexico in 1863 received instructions (which leaked into the press) to the effect that the Emperor's purpose was to establish a Mexican government strong enough to limit "the growth and prestige of the United States."³ At a time when the American Union appeared to be breaking up under pressure from its southern half, such a statement meant to American readers that Napoleon had no intention of stopping at the Rio Grande.

³ J. Fred Rippey, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), p. 261, citing Genaro y Carlos Pereyra Garcia, *Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de Méjico* (20 vols., Mexico City, 1903), XIV, pp. 8-20.

In June 1863 French arms swept the Liberal government of President Benito Juárez from Mexico City, and in the summer of 1864 Napoleon installed the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, thirty-two-year-old brother of Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, on the new throne of Mexico. During this period the Northern people, their belligerence aroused by the Southern rebellion, were clamoring for action against France — action that might well bring disaster upon them. Aggressive behavior by the United States might give Napoleon the popular support he needed to join hands with the Confederacy in a declaration of war, a development that could provide Secession with enough extra strength to prevail.

While the Civil War lasted, Congress and the public were held in check largely through the prestige and political skill of the Federal Secretary of State, William H. Seward. But when the War was over — by which time the government had reason to believe that Napoleon had become disenchanted with his puppets in Mexico — Seward was ready to turn his people's aggressive demeanor to advantage, and he warned Napoleon that their will would sooner or later prevail. Before this statement reached Paris, however, the United States Minister there, John Bigelow, who had been mirroring Seward's new firmness for some months, had in September 1865 obtained a tentative statement from the French that they intended to withdraw from Mexico.⁴

While Bigelow was shaking an admonitory finger at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an American military fist was being displayed before the French along the Rio Grande. Promptly upon the silencing of Confederate guns, General Grant sent Philip Sheridan, second only to William T. Sherman in the esteem of the General-in-Chief, to the command of the Department of the Gulf, with headquarters at New Orleans. A considerable force was posted along the Mexican frontier and designated an "army of observation."

⁴ Rippey, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-65 and 269-72; Seward to Bigelow, September 21, 1865. All diplomatic correspondence sent or received by United States officials that is cited herein will be found in the *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress* (covering the year 1865), *Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress* (1866), and *Second Session, Fortieth Congress* (1867-68).

Sheridan and Intelligence

Sheridan, thirty-four years old and the possessor of a reputation as a gamecock, adhered strongly to an opinion prevalent in the Army that a little forceful military action now would save a full-scale war later. The audacious statesman who was directing foreign policy at Washington was, to Sheridan, "slow and poky," and the general found ways of giving considerable covert aid to the Juárez government, then leading a nomadic existence in the north of Mexico.⁵ Sheridan and Seward, though the policy of each was anathema to the other, made an effective combination.

One of the ways in which Sheridan could exercise his relentless energy against the Imperialists without flouting Seward's policy was in collecting intelligence on what was going on below the border. There was an interregnum at the United States Legation in Mexico City, and all the official news reaching Washington from below the Rio Grande was that supplied by the Juarist Minister to the United States, Matias Romero, a scarcely unbiased source if a prolific one.⁶ Sheridan quickly undertook to fill the gap.

This task must have been decidedly to the general's taste, for he had been one of the most intelligence-conscious commanders in the Civil War.⁷ He had achieved something of an innovation in organizing intelligence activities when, during his 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, he established a group of intelligence operatives under military control. His previous sources of information, local citizens and Confederate deserters, had both proved unreliable. "Sheridan's Scouts" were a military organization in a day when it was customary to have civilians perform most of the intelligence-gathering tasks other

⁵ John M. Schofield, *Forty-Six Years in the Army* (New York, 1897), p. 381; Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* (2 vols., New York, 1888), II, pp. 215-19; Percy F. Martin, *Maximilian in Mexico* (London, 1914), p. 432.

⁶ Dozens of examples of this intelligence will be found in the Romero-to-Seward correspondence in the *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* described in footnote 4.

⁷ When a division commander in 1862-63, Sheridan had exercised an initiative in intelligence collection that was more likely to be found in an army commander. His *Memoirs* reveal a constantly high interest in intelligence activities.

than battle-zone reconnaissance. After the war, Major Henry Harrison Young, the Scouts' commander, and four of his best men went to the Gulf Department with Sheridan.

Sheridan also, in common with numerous other commanders North and South, had an acquaintance with communications intelligence as it was produced in the field command of that day. By the time the Civil War was well advanced, Signal Corpsmen in every theater had learned how to solve the enemy's visual-signaling alphabets, and they derived much information for the commanders by keeping their field glasses trained on enemy signal stations.⁸ There was not likely to be any opportunity for such methods along the Rio Grande, however, and no more likely was the possibility of tapping telegraph lines carrying useful information.

Young and his four men were dispatched to important points in northern Mexico to report on movements of the Imperial forces and the various projects of ex-Confederates who were joining Maximilian's forces and attempting to establish colonies under his flag.⁹ Judged by the accuracy of the reports reaching Sheridan and the strong tendency of the Southerners' projects to abort after coming under his notice, the work of these five men was most effective.¹⁰

1866, Year of Telegrams and Tension

The critical question — whether the French would tire of their venture and withdraw — was, however, one to which no intelligence service could divine an answer, for the French for a long time did not know the answer themselves. In 1865 Marshal François Achille Bazaine, now Napoleon's commander in Mexico, was informed by the Minister of War that he must bring the army home, and at about the same time he received

⁸ *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1884-1901) contains hundreds of decipherments resulting from such interceptions, chiefly in the operations of 1863-65 in Tennessee and Georgia, the operations along the South Carolina coast beginning in 1863, and the Richmond-Petersburg siege of 1864-65.

⁹ Sheridan, *op. cit.*, II, p. 214.

¹⁰ See, for example, intelligence reports sent by Sheridan to Grant, March 27, May 7, June 24, July 3 and 13, 1866. All Army correspondence cited hereafter in this article will be found in the United States National Archives, except where otherwise indicated.

word to the opposite effect from the Emperor himself.¹¹ Napoleon's treaty with Maximilian by which the latter accepted the throne of Mexico contained a secret clause providing that French military forces to the number of 20,000 were to remain in Mexico until November 1867.¹² As events were to prove, however, this compact was less likely to determine Napoleon's course of action than were the pressures on him represented by the United States' vigorous diplomacy and the rising military power of Prussia.

In April 1866 Minister Bigelow succeeded in pinning Napoleon down to a definite understanding, to the effect that the 28,000 French soldiers in Mexico would be brought home in three detachments, leaving in November 1866 and March and November 1867. Seward's reply to this promise was characteristic of his tone at this time: dwelling only briefly on the diplomatic niceties, he suggested that the remaining period of occupation be shortened if possible. The Secretary was in high feather; in the same month a protest by him induced the Austrian government to abandon an effort to send substantial reinforcements to the small Austrian force in Maximilian's army.¹³

In June Maximilian received a studiously insolent letter from Napoleon containing the stunning announcement that the French would withdraw. Attention now focused on whether he would attempt to hold his throne without French arms. The unhappy sovereign reacted first by dispatching his Empress, twenty-six-year-old Carlota, to Paris in a vain attempt to change Napoleon's mind. He soon decided to abdicate, then determined to remain on his throne, then wavered for many weeks between abdicating and remaining.¹⁴

Napoleon meanwhile had to contend not only with his protégé's indecision but with some apparent recalcitrance on the

¹¹ Philip Guedalla, *The Two Marshals* (London, 1943) p. 130.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹³ Seward to de Montholon, April 25, 1866; Seward to J. Lothrop Motley (United States Minister to Austria), April 6, 16, 30, May 3, 30, 1866; Motley to Seward, April 6, May 1, 6, 15, 21, 1866; James M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, 1932), p. 235.

¹⁴ Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-267 and 272-273.

part of Bazaine, who was variously suspected of having a secret agreement with Maximilian to remain in the latter's support, of being secretly in league with the Mexican Liberals, of profiting financially from his official position, and of having hopes of succeeding Maximilian. (There is evidence to support all these suspicions.)¹⁵ Soon Napoleon realized he had made a bad bargain with the United States; to attempt to bring the army home in three parts would risk the annihilation of the last third. Early in the autumn of 1866 the Emperor sent his military aide, General Castelnau, to Mexico with instructions to have the army ready to leave in one shipment in March, and to supersede Bazaine if necessary. Thus the evacuation was to begin four months later than Napoleon had promised, but to end eight months earlier.¹⁶

No word of this important about-face was, however, promptly passed to the United States government. At the beginning of November — supposedly the month for the first shipment — the best information this country's leaders possessed was a strong indication that Napoleon intended to rid himself of Maximilian. This was contained in a letter written to Maximilian by a confidential agent whom he had sent to Europe; it showed the failure of Carlota's visit to Napoleon. Somewhere between its point of origin, Brussels, and its destination, the office of Maximilian's consul in New York, it had fallen into the hands of a Juarist agent.¹⁷ Soon after Minister Romero placed it in Seward's hands, Napoleon's new Foreign Minister, the Marquis de Moustier, wrote his Minister in Washington, de Montholon, that the evacuation timetable was raising serious difficulties but that in no case would the November 1867 deadline for its

¹⁵ Castelnau to Napoleon, December 8, 1866, quoted in Georges A. M. Girard, *La Vie et les souvenirs du General Castelnau* (Paris, 1930), pp. 112-124; Marcus Otterbourg (United States charge d'affaires in Mexico) to Seward, December 29, 1866; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-99; Lewis D. Campbell (United States Minister to Mexico) to Seward, November 21, 1866.

¹⁶ De Moustier (Foreign Minister) to de Montholon (Minister to the United States), October 16, 1866, in *Foreign Affairs*; Bigelow to Seward, November 8, 1866; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57; Guedalla, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁷ Romero to Seward, October 10, 1866; *New York Tribune*, January 4, 1867.

completion be exceeded.¹⁸ This note should have reached Seward in early November (1866), but if it did, its strong hint that there would be no partial evacuation in that month was apparently lost on him.

When the French felt able to promise complete withdrawal in March, de Moustier revealed to Bigelow the abandonment of the three-stage plan. So alarmed was Bigelow by the prospect of a major outbreak of anti-French feeling in America that he refrained from sending the news to Seward until he had heard it from the Emperor himself, whom he saw on November 7. The November shipment had been cancelled for reasons purely military, the Emperor said, showing surprise that the United States had not known of the change. The order had been telegraphed to Bazaine and had been sent in the clear in order that "no secret might be made of its tenor in the United States."¹⁹ Undoubtedly the Emperor was perfectly sincere in implying that he expected the United States government to make itself a tacit "information addressee" on telegrams of foreign governments reaching its territory.

Receiving Bigelow's report of this interview, Seward struck off a peremptory cablegram to Paris: the United States "can not acquiesce," he declared. The 774 words of this message unfolded before Bigelow on November 26 and 27, their transmission having cost the State Department some \$13,000. On December 3 Bigelow telegraphed the Foreign Minister's assurance that military considerations alone were responsible for the change of plans and his promise, somewhat more definite than the previous one, that the French "corps of occupation is to embark in the month of March next."²⁰

So strongly had this government relied on Napoleon's original promise that President Johnson had dispatched an important diplomatic mission to Mexico (republican Mexico, that is) — a mission that was already at sea, expecting, on arrival at Vera

¹⁸ De Moustier to de Montholon, October 16, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Bigelow to Seward, November 8, 1866.

²⁰ Seward to Bigelow, November 23, 1866; Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867* (Baltimore, 1933), p. 534; Bigelow to Seward, December 3, 1866.

Cruz, to find the French leaving and Juárez resuming the reins of government. The mission consisted of ex-Senator Lewis D. Campbell, newly appointed Minister to Mexico, and General William T. Sherman, sent with Campbell to give the mission prestige, to advise Juárez in regard to the many military problems that would be plaguing him,²¹ and possibly to arrange for the use of small numbers of United States troops to assist the Liberal regime by temporarily occupying certain island forts.²²

Evidence was accumulating that Maximilian and his European troops would soon be gone from Mexico,²³ but it stood no chance of general acceptance in Washington. Such was the degree of trust now accorded Louis Napoleon that his promise to evacuate Mexico would be believed on the day when the last French soldier took ship at Vera Cruz.

At this juncture Sheridan's headquarters came into possession of a copy of a coded telegram to Napoleon from Bazaine and Castelnau. The message had left Mexico City by courier on December 3 and had been delivered to the French Consulate at New Orleans, from where it was telegraphed to Paris on the 9th. As will be explained below, there is every reason to believe that this message went unread by United States cryptographers. The possession of its contents would have been of great value, for the message (as translated from the version given by Castelnau's biographer) said:

²¹ Seward's instructions to Campbell, dated October 25, 1866, are perhaps the most impressive of the numerous masterful documents produced by the Secretary in the Mexican affair. Grant was the President's first selection as the military member of the mission and was excused only after a number of urgent requests. Correspondence relating to the inception of the Sherman-Campbell mission includes: Andrew Johnson to E. M. Stanton, October 26 and 30; Grant to Sherman (at St. Louis), October 20 and 22; Grant to Johnson, October 20 and 21, and Grant to Stanton, October 27.

²² Sherman to Grant, November 3, 1866 (Sherman MSS, Library of Congress); Grant to Sheridan, November 4, 1866. Sheridan was directed to "comply with any request as to location of troops in your department that Lt. Gen. Sherman . . . may make."

²³ Campbell to Seward, November 21, 1866; unaddressed, unsigned military intelligence report dated at Washington, November 18.

New Orleans, 9 Dec 1866

To His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon at Paris.
Mexico, 3rd December.

Emperor Maximilian appears to wish to remain in Mexico, but we must not count on it. Since the evacuation is to be completed in March, it is urgent that the transports arrive. We think that the foreign regiment must also be embarked. As for the French officers and soldiers attached to the Mexican Corps, can they be allowed the option of returning?

The country is restless. The Campbell and Sherman mission, which arrived off Vera Cruz on November 29 and left December 3, seems disposed to a peaceful solution. Nevertheless it gives moral support to the Juarists through the statement of the Federal government.

Marshal Bazaine and General Castelnau ²⁴

As December wore on, rumblings from Capitol Hill indicated that Congress — the same Congress that was even then moving to impeach President Johnson — might attempt to take the management of the entire affair out of the Administration's hands. Word arrived from Bigelow that transports to bring the army home were ready to sail from French ports, but that information would by no means be convincing enough to reassure Washington. And that word was the last to be heard from Bigelow, as competent a reporter as he was a diplomatist. He was relieved as Minister by John Adams Dix, ex-senator, ex-general, who did not manage to turn his hand to report-writing until mid-February, after the crisis was past.²⁵

Similarly, nothing that would clarify the situation was coming out of Mexico. General Grant received a report from Sherman, at Vera Cruz, containing two items of intelligence, highly significant and completely contradictory: two ships, waiting at Vera Cruz to take Maximilian home, had been loaded with tremendous quantities of royal baggage; and the Emperor had just issued a proclamation to the Mexican people announcing

²⁴ Girard, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18.

²⁵ *New York Herald*, December 7, 1866, p. 4, col. 3; Bigelow to Seward, November 30, 1866; Morgan Dix, *Memoirs of John Adams Dix* (2 vols., New York, 1883), II, 150; Dix to Seward, December 24, 1866.

<p>Branch No. 1. THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. The value of the Company's service is not subject to any limitation, and the service is not subject to any limitation of the Company's liability for the transmission of messages, and the Company is not liable for the transmission of messages. C. H. PALMER, Secy. J. H. WADE, Pres.</p> <p>Dated, <i>New Orleans 9 Dec</i> 1866</p> <p>Received at: <i>A. H. Mafady the Emperor's Rep.</i> <i>at Paris</i></p> <p><i>Mexico third 300 December has</i> <i>thousand two hundred and</i> <i>nine 2207 six hundred and thirteen</i> <i>613 five hundred and sixty two</i> <i>562 two hundred and seventy three</i> <i>fifteen two thousand two hundred</i> <i>fourteen 2219 five hundred and</i> <i>eight 2219 two hundred and thirty two</i> <i>three hundred and one 207 four hundred</i> <i>and thirteen 207 nine hundred and</i> <i>eighty four 984 seventy 70 eight</i> <i>hundred and fourteen 1814</i> <i>five hundred and seventy two 572</i> <i>three hundred and fifty 350</i></p>	<p>Branch No. 1. THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. The value of the Company's service is not subject to any limitation, and the service is not subject to any limitation of the Company's liability for the transmission of messages, and the Company is not liable for the transmission of messages. C. H. PALMER, Secy. J. H. WADE, Pres.</p> <p>Dated, _____ 1866</p> <p>Received at _____</p> <p>To _____</p> <p><i>three hundred and seven 307 one</i> <i>hundred and thirty 130 two hundred and</i> <i>eighty 280 seven hundred and fifty</i> <i>five 1756 eighty nine 89 two thousand</i> <i>two hundred and fifty seven 257</i> <i>three hundred and fifty eight 358</i> <i>five hundred and forty two 642</i> <i>fourty nine 9 seven hundred and</i> <i>fifty 550 from 754 two thousand</i> <i>and twenty six 2076</i></p> <p><i>Marshall Bazaine</i> <i>& General Castelnau</i></p> <p><i>375 words</i> <i>1882 letters 1979 25 pd in gold</i> <i>Double tariff</i></p>
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First and last pages of the five-page message to Napoleon III from his commanders in Mexico, reporting on the situation there and asking instructions concerning the evacuation of the European forces. The French clear-text version, as repeated by General Castelnau in a letter to Napoleon on December 8, 1866 (and quoted by Castelnau's biographer), reads:

L'empereur Maximilien paraît vouloir rester au Mexique, mais on ne peut y compter. L'évacuation devant être terminée en mars, il est urgent que les transports arrivent. Nous pensons que le régiment étranger doit être aussi embarqué. Quant aux officiers et soldats français détachés aux corps mexicains, peut-on leur laisser la faculté de revenir? Le pays est inquiet. La mission Campbell et Sherman arrivée devant Vera Cruz le 29 novembre et partie le 3 décembre semble disposée à une solution pacifique. Elle n'en donne pas moins un appui moral aux Juaristes par la déclaration du gouvernement fédéral.

his intention to remain. Sherman and Campbell were facing a dilemma, in that they could not reach Juárez without crossing territory held by the Imperialists, with whom they were supposed to have nothing to do. Sherman invited Grant to instruct him to go to Mexico City to see Bazaine, who, he was sure, would tell him the truth about French intentions, but nothing came of this suggestion. Wrote the general of the colorful pen and the fervid dislike of politics: "I am as anxious to find Juarez as Japhet was to find his father, that I may dispose of this mission."²⁶

Tension mounted in Washington early in January as the Senate prepared for a debate on the Mexican question, and a wide variety of reports circulated, the most ominous being that half of the French forces were to remain in Mexico through the summer, and that Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward, who had sailed mysteriously from Annapolis on Christmas day, was on his way to see Napoleon. (He was en route to the West Indies on one of his father's projects for the purchase of territory.)²⁷ But on January 12, before the Senate got around to the Mexican question, the War Department received a message from Sheridan at New Orleans transmitting the following telegram:

Paris Jany 10th

French Consul New Orleans
for General Cast[elnau] at Mexico.

Received your dispatch of the ninth December. Do not compel the Emperor to abdicate, but do not delay the departure of the troops; bring back all those who will not remain there. Most of the fleet has left.

NAPOLEON.

²⁶ Sherman to Grant, December 1 and 7, 1866. Sherman, despite his reputation for hard-headedness, was not one of those who favored military action by the United States in Mexico. He wrote Grant, "I feel as bitter as you do about this meddling of Napoleon, but we can bide our time and not punish ourselves by picking up a burden [the French] can't afford to carry."

²⁷ *New York Herald*, January 3, 1867; *New York Evening Post*, January 8, 1867; Frederick W. Seward, *Reminiscences of a War-time Statesman and Diplomat* (New York and London, 1916), pp. 348-55. Seward's project, a very closely kept secret, was the acquisition of a harbor in San Domingo. A treaty was later concluded but buried by the Senate.

<p>THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.</p> <p>142</p> <p>Dated, <i>Jan 10 1867</i></p> <p>Received at <i>Consul De France</i> <i>Nouvelle Orleans</i> <i>Pour Le General Castelnau</i> <i>a Mexico</i></p> <p><i>Recu depêche de vous</i> <i>deuxième de France</i> <i>L'Empereur a abdiqué</i> <i>mais ne retardez pas le</i> <i>départ des troupes</i> <i>rapatriant tous ceux qui</i> <i>ne voudront pas rester</i> <i>la plupart des navires</i> <i>sont partis</i> <i>Napoleon</i> <i>Paris</i> <i>Dix Janvier</i> <i>34/10/1867</i></p>	<p><i>Recd 230 PM</i> <i>In cipher</i></p> <p>United States Military Telegraph. War Department.</p> <p><i>1867</i> <i>Jan 12 1867</i></p> <p><i>General U. S. Grant.</i> <i>I respectfully transmit the</i> <i>following telegram for your information.</i> <i>"Paris Jan 11"</i></p> <p><i>French Consul</i> <i>at Orleans</i> <i>to General Castelnau</i> <i>at Mexico.</i></p> <p><i>Received your dispatch of the</i> <i>9th December? Do not answer the</i> <i>Empereur's abolition, but do not delay</i> <i>the departure of the troops; they think</i> <i>all those who will not remain there.</i> <i>Most of the fleet has left</i> <i>(signed) Napoleon."</i></p> <p><i>The above is genuine</i> <i>G. H. Sheridan</i> <i>Maj. Gen. Comd.</i></p>
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Napoleon III's "Bring the army home" message, and the one by which General Sheridan transmitted it in translation to General Grant. The notation on the Sheridan-to-Grant message "Recd 230 PM In cipher" refers to its receipt and decipherment in the War Department, and so does not bear on Sheridan's later assertion that Napoleon's message was sent in cipher.

The phrase "will not remain there" was a translation error. It was corrected to "are not willing to remain" when Sheridan forwarded a confirmation copy of his telegram by mail later on January 12. "Most of the fleet has left" (referring to the departure of transports for Mexico) would have been better translated "Most of the ships have left."

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A Cable From Napoleon

Here now was a conclusive answer to both of the pressing questions, the French evacuation and Maximilian's future. The entire French force must be leaving; else there would scarcely be a question of compelling Maximilian to abdicate. And with the French gone, Maximilian, even if he remained firm in his decision to keep the throne, could hardly stand against the rising Liberals very long. The European threat to American soil could be considered virtually at an end.

How It Happened

Because of the historical importance attaching to the interception of this message and the Mexico-to-Paris message of a month earlier, the circumstances surrounding the interception are worth examining.

The two telegrams owed their existence to the successful installation of the Atlantic cable a few months before. The cable's own history went back to August 1857, when the first attempt to lay it ended in failure. A year later a connection was completed and the cable was operated for eleven weeks before it went dead, apparently because the use of a very high voltage had broken down the insulation. Renewal of the attempt awaited the development of better electrical techniques and the end of the Civil War. In 1865 a new cable was laid from Valentia, Ireland, but was lost six hundred miles short of Newfoundland. Another was started July 13, 1866, and brought ashore at Heart's Content, Newfoundland, on July 27. The ill-starred steamer *Great Eastern*, which laid it, then picked up the buried end of the 1865 cable and ran a second line to Newfoundland. Service to the public opened August 26.²⁸

Thus Napoleon's September message to Bazaine passed after the permanent operation of a telegraph line across the Atlantic had been a reality for only a few weeks, and it must be conceded that the United States was reasonably prompt in availing itself of this source of intelligence — despite Napoleon's opinion to the contrary.

²⁸ Robert Luther Thompson, *Wiring a Continent* (Princeton, 1947), pp. 299-301, 319-20, 323, 433-34; S. A. Garnham and Robert L. Hadfield, *The Submarine Cable* (London, 1934), pp. 19-40. The cable laying was the only success in the long career of the leviathan *Great Eastern*, which bankrupted a succession of owners as a passenger and cargo ship, as an exhibition ship, and finally as a gigantic dismantling and salvage operation. Its history is told by James Dugan in *The Great Iron Ship* (New York, 1953).

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Although the first interception took place only a month after the French Emperor had virtually invited this government to read his mail, it appears that Napoleon's suggestion had nothing to do with it. The author of the intercept scheme, in all probability, was General Sheridan, and it is highly unlikely that Napoleon's remarks would have been communicated to him. In any case, no instructions for surveillance of the telegraph lines to obtain French messages appear in the correspondence to the Gulf Department from Army Headquarters.²⁹

Years later Sheridan explained how the job was done: his telegraph operator and cipher clerk, Charles A. Keefer, one of the numerous Canadians who entered the Union and Confederate telegraph services, had succeeded in "getting possession of the telegraph and managing [a] secret line,"³⁰ which presumably connected his office with the Western Union wires in New Orleans.

Keefer's "secret line" may not have been so remarkable a thing as Sheridan's cryptic account makes it seem, for there was a high degree of integration between the Military Telegraph system to which Keefer belonged and the commercial system over which the messages passed. Throughout the occupied areas of the South during and after the Civil War, the Military Telegraph service took over commercial and railroad telegraph facilities wherever they existed. These Military Telegraph offices accepted commercial as well as government business, and commercial offices of course sent and received thousands of military telegrams; many a telegraph circuit had a military office at one terminus and a commercial office at the other.

As the Reconstruction period advanced, this integration became even closer; when the wires were returned to the use of the companies that owned them, Military Telegraph officers remained on duty to take care of government business and exercise a loose kind of supervision over the commercial opera-

²⁹ Correspondence from August 1 to December 10, 1866, has been examined for evidence of such instructions. Sheridan's papers in the Library of Congress appear to be incomplete for this period.

³⁰ Unaddressed official statement signed by Sheridan December 8, 1877 (sic). William R. Plum, *The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States* (2 vols., Chicago, 1882), II, pp. 343 and 357, is authority for the information on Keefer's nationality.

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tions. At some places military and commercial operators worked side by side. The fact that Keefer's copies of the French telegrams were written on Western Union message blanks makes it appear that New Orleans was one of the cities where this arrangement was in effect. If it was not, and the Military Telegraph and Western Union offices there were located separately, they were nevertheless using the same wires for communication with distant points, which would have made it comparatively easy for Keefer to connect a "secret line."

This integration of operations went all the way to the top of the two telegraph systems. General Thomas T. Eckert, who had been the second-ranking member and active head of the Military Telegraph service, continued to be closely connected with it after becoming Assistant Secretary of War in 1866. In the period now under study Eckert was apparently occupying his War Department position and at the same time resuming his activities in the industry as Eastern Division superintendent for Western Union at New York.³¹

Sheridan also credited Keefer with having solved the French "cipher,"³² but there is strong evidence to the contrary:

(1) The amount of material Keefer could have had to work with was very small. The cable in its early years was used sparingly because of the very high tolls (note the \$1,979.25 charge, in gold, that the French Consulate paid for the December 3/9 message). Thus Paris was still awaiting word from Castelnau at the end of November,³³ although he had been in Mexico nearly two months. The only French messages referred to in any of the documents examined in the present study are the clear-text message that Napoleon said he sent Bazaine in September,³⁴ the message of December 3/9, and the message of January 10. Accordingly, as the January message (to be discussed in detail below) was almost certainly sent in the clear,

³¹ Plum, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 345-48. The War Department records for 1866 and 1867 contain frequent cipher telegrams to Secretary Stanton from Eckert in New York; some of these messages bear dates subsequent to Eckert's resignation from the Department.

³² From Sheridan's statement of December 8, 1877, and his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 226.

³³ Bigelow to Seward, November 30, 1866.

³⁴ This message has not been found by the writer in either French or United States records available in Washington.

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it is highly probable that the December 3/9 message from Bazaine and Castelnau to Napoleon was the only encrypted French telegram that passed between Mexico and France during the entire period of the French intervention.⁸⁵ It is extremely unlikely that the code — for the message was in code and not cipher — could have been solved from this one message of eighty-eight groups.

(2) An examination of all available United States records that could reasonably be expected to contain such an item (if it existed) fails to uncover a decrypted version of the December 3/9 message or any other evidence that the government during the ensuing weeks had come into possession of the information it contained.⁸⁶

Somewhat surprising is the apparent fact that Sheridan did not send the message to the War Department cryptographers for study. On several occasions during the Civil War, these men had been able to read enemy messages referred to them. This experience (so far as it is recorded) was, however, limited to the solution of certain ciphers (some of which were relatively complex for that day),⁸⁷ and the French code would have presented them with a strange and much more difficult problem. Union cryptographers at New Orleans had also once solved a captured message,⁸⁸ a fact which may have induced Sheridan to rely on his own headquarters' capability and not turn to Washington.

⁸⁵ This message and the French version of the January 10 message are filed in the National Archives with telegrams sent from the military headquarters at New Orleans during the years 1864-69. This filing is clearly in error, for the messages are foreign to the rest of the material in this file and they bear none of the marks that an operator would have placed on them had he transmitted them. War Department and Army Headquarters records do not show their receipt.

⁸⁶ Besides the government records cited elsewhere, the following collections have been searched for such evidence: the Andrew Johnson MSS, Sheridan MSS, Grant MSS, Edwin M. Stanton MSS, all in the Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, and the contemporary correspondence between the War Department and State Department in the National Archives. Despite the extreme improbability that the message contents were obtained by solving the French code, this search took account of the possibility that the developments reported in the message were learned by other means.

It was the January 10 message from Napoleon, the only message mentioned in Sheridan's account of this episode, that the general said Keefer had solved. But there is every reason to believe that the French clear-text of this message is the message as received in New Orleans, and not a decoded version of that message. Note:

(1) The message heading. It is filled out in precisely the way that was standard procedure in telegraphic reception at that period. A considerably different format was used for the delivery of plain-text versions of friendly messages received in cipher, and since Keefer was also a Military Telegraph cipher clerk, he would probably have used that format or a similar one in writing up the plain text of a foreign cipher or code message. (This format is illustrated by the photostat of the deciphered version of Sheridan's January 12 message, of which Napoleon's message of the 10th was a part.)

(2) The difficulties that the copyist had with French spellings (Castelnau, *décembre*, *forcez*, *abdiquer*, *navires*). These are the difficulties of a telegraph operator receiving in a strange language. A cryptographer in writing up a decoded message would scarcely have made so many false strokes and misspellings; and with such a poor knowledge of the French language, he could scarcely have solved a coded message in French.

In addition to the above evidence, there is the extreme unlikelihood that this message added to the earlier one would have given Keefer enough material to have solved the code. There is also reason to believe, from Napoleon's statement to Bigelow regarding the message he sent Bazaine in September,

⁸⁷ The Confederates used two kinds of cipher, both involving the substitution of one character for another. What appears to be a representative if not a complete account of the cryptanalytic experiences of the Washington cryptographers is given by David Homer Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office* (New York, 1907), pp. 66-85. Bates was in the War Department telegraph and cipher office throughout the Civil War. The infrequency of such activity was plainly the result of the difficulty in obtaining intercepts (except at the front, where the traffic intercepted was almost always visual). All the cryptanalytic episodes reported by Bates involved intercepted courier and mail dispatches rather than messages obtained by wiretapping.

⁸⁸ Plum, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 36-39.

that political considerations might well have induced the Emperor to send this message through the United States in the clear.

Impact and Epilogue

Rare indeed is the single intelligence item that is at once so important and so unmistakable in meaning as the intercept of January 10. Its effect on events, however, can only be estimated, for no reference to it appears in the records of the developments that followed.

On the 17th the French Minister came to Seward proposing that France and the United States enter into an agreement for the governing of Mexico during the period that would follow the departure of the French troops. France's only stipulation was that the interim government exclude Juárez. The United States, having consistently pursued a policy of recognition of Juárez and nonrecognition of Maximilian, could never have voluntarily accepted such a proposal. And since southern Texas was well garrisoned with troops remaining from the magnificent army that had subdued the Confederacy, involuntary acceptance was likewise out of the question. But Seward might reasonably have entertained the proposal and then engaged in time-consuming negotiations, awaiting news from Mexico that the French were gone. Instead, he dismissed Napoleon's Minister with little ceremony;⁸⁸ his firmness probably stemmed largely from knowledge that the French withdrawal was already well advanced and the Emperor's proposal could be only an effort to save face.

The effect that Sheridan's communications intelligence enterprise had on international affairs, then, was probably this: it did not induce a change in policy or any other positive action, but it materially helped the government ride out a dangerous situation simply by sitting tight.

The Administration's domestic position, however, was as weak as its international position was strong. When the Senate on the 15th got around to its foreign policy debate, an earnest effort was made to embarrass the Administration (although the threatened attempt to take foreign policy out of

⁸⁸ Seward to Minister Berthemy, January 21, 1865 (memorandum of conversation of January 17).

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its hands did not materialize). The debate continued into the 16th, when Senator Charles Sumner, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, saw fit to announce that he had reliable information (including a copy of a dispatch to the State Department from the United States Consul at Vera Cruz) that the French were withdrawing. That ended the matter.⁴⁰ Neither Seward nor the President seems to have said anything to counter the unfriendly speechmaking, having in Sumner a more direct means of silencing the opposition. Although the senator was no friend of the Administration, at least some of its intelligence information had been given to him for that purpose. From the conviction with which Sumner addressed his colleagues, one is tempted to believe that intelligence much more sensitive — and more convincing — than the consular dispatch had been confided to him.

Seward's ability to close out the Mexican affair with firmness and surehandedness must have substantially bolstered the Presidential prestige, which in that year was at the lowest ebb it has reached in the nation's history. Had the government's resistance to the French intervention been anything but a resounding success, Andrew Johnson might well have failed to muster the one-vote margin by which the impeachment proceedings against him were defeated.

Before January ended, the intelligence conveyed by Napoleon's cablegram was supported by details of the French withdrawal received from other sources, one of them an unnamed spy who was sent by Sheridan to the Vera Cruz area and returned with convincing evidence of preparations for the embarkation of the Army.⁴¹ Bazaine led the last remnants of the French force out of Mexico City on February 5. Two weeks later embarkation had begun at Vera Cruz, and by March 11 it was complete.

Maximilian's regime quickly collapsed. He foolishly bottled up his small army of Mexicans, Austrians, and Belgians in Querétaro, a hundred miles northwest of the capital. An agent

⁴⁰ *Congressional Globe*, January 16, 1867.

⁴¹ Sheridan to J. A. Rawlins (Chief of Staff to Grant), January 4, 1867. The ordinary period for transmittal of mail would have caused this dispatch to arrive in Washington perhaps a week later than the January 10 telegram from Paris via New Orleans.

of Sheridan, with this army by permission, late in February reported the Imperialists marching out of Querétaro and driving the enemy before them, but the offensive was shortlived. Soon Maximilian was back in Querétaro under siege, and on May 19, as a result of treachery by a Mexican Imperialist officer related by marriage to Bazaine, the garrison was captured.⁴²

Seward had literally "scolded Napoleon out of Mexico," but if the final issue of *l'affaire Maximilien* was a triumph for American diplomacy, the fate of the unhappy sovereign himself was a sorry story of nonperformance of duty by an American diplomat. After Sherman had been excused from further participation in the mission, Minister Campbell stationed himself at New Orleans and determinedly resisted repeated efforts by Seward to get him into Mexico. In April, when it had become plain that the siege of Querétaro would end in the capture of Maximilian, Seward sent an urgent plea for Maximilian's life, instructing Campbell to find Juárez and deliver the message in person. It was delivered to the head of the Mexican government not by Campbell, ex-colonel, ex-senator, but by James White, sergeant. Such pleas delivered later on by a diplomatic Chief of Mission were heeded, but this one was of no avail, and Maximilian lost his life before a firing squad at Querétaro on June 19, 1867. Four days earlier, too late to affect the fate of the misguided prince, Seward had given Campbell a new title: ex-Minister.⁴³

⁴² Martin, *op. cit.*, 295-97; unsigned letter to Sheridan from his agent in Querétaro, February 26.

⁴³ *New York Herald*, December 7, 1866; Seward to Campbell, December 25, 1866, January 2, 8, 23, April 6, June 1, 5, 8, 11, 15, 1867; Campbell to Seward, December 24, 1866, January 2, 7, February 9, March 12, and June 3, 6, 10, 15, and 16, 1867; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 408, 411; Sheridan, *op. cit.*, II, p. 227.

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Dear Sirs:

I should like to comment critically on Lewis R. Long's article, "Concepts for a Philosophy of Air Intelligence," that appeared in *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 31-50. Air intelligence is a subject with which I can claim some familiarity. In World War II, I served as Chief of the Target Intelligence Division in a combat Air Force headquarters, as commanding officer of an OSS-type organization that provided intelligence to air units for close support of ground forces, and as Chief of the Intelligence Division of Theater G-2 Section.

Colonel Long advocates a greatly expanded mission for air intelligence, one that far exceeds the requirements of the air commander because it includes areas where the air commander has no assigned decision-making or operational competence. The article builds up its case from the proposition (p. 40) that "air intelligence must encompass all aspects of power in foreign nations." By "encompass," the author means that the Air Force command must, in effect, have its own estimates of "all aspects of power in foreign nations (political, economic and psychological as well as military)," prepared by its own experts on the basis of information collected through its own operations (including covert operations), and that the Air Force should act offensively through political, economic and psychological warfare, both in cold and hot war situations, presumably deriving its inspiration for these activities from its own estimates. He also postulates as a proper function of air intelligence (p. 49) informing the American public "on a planned basis" about Soviet activities.

No one can argue that the air commander should be uninformed about "aspects of power in foreign nations," and all will agree that he must know everything possible about that part of the total enemy situation directly concerned with his assigned operational mission. However, the assigned mission does not impinge directly on all aspects of the enemy situation, but only on a discrete sector thereof. That his own people do not overtly and covertly collect and process intelligence on the aspects lying outside his assigned operational responsibilities

does not mean that the commander has to remain ignorant of the larger picture. He can draw on the intelligence community, where he is represented, for this information, and he need not duplicate existing facilities.

Colonel Long's contention that the air arm should engage in political, economic and psychological warfare in hot and cold war situations is hard to take seriously. One could equally well argue that Treasury and Commerce, having operational responsibilities relating to the economies of Communist countries, should have their own air photo recon organization for Communist country overflights to get the information on industrial establishments that they need to meet their responsibilities. For the air arm to engage in these three activities would mean duplicating facilities already in existence and in use, and it would mean going far beyond the assigned Air Force mission, assuming roles already allocated and assigned to other agencies of the government.

Colonel Long supports his claim for greatly expanded responsibilities for air intelligence by an appeal to Clausewitz' statement that war is an extension of policy by other means, and by the argument that the Marxists have shown how "the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremely nebulous." He says that the Air Force "will have to carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy," and "seek out and destroy all aspects of warmaking potential and will to fight." Even were these truisms, it would not logically follow that air intelligence should be what he would have it. Indeed the only logical justification for his position would have to come from a demonstration that the Air Force is the paramount element in the executive branch of the Government, with all other elements, including the office of the Chief Executive, subordinate to it. In this situation the air command would need an intelligence service such as that described.

In conclusion, air intelligence is a very difficult business to do well. I suspect that Colonel Long himself knows that there has always been more to it than the concentration on (p. 41) "strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces" which he postulates as the alternative to his expanded role. Even at its highest stage of development in WW II—witness, for example, the incredibly bad intelligence preparation for the XXth Bomber Command strikes on Yawata and Anshan—there was

always room for great improvement. I submit that air intelligence has enough to do to support the air commander in his assigned responsibilities without seeking to encompass the responsibilities of other organizations.

Yours truly,
R. A. RANDOM

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BEHIND ENEMY LINES

The history of intelligence activities during World War II includes many chapters on adventures and accomplishments in the German-occupied countries, but nothing to equal in scale and in organization the systematic intelligence collection effort carried out in Poland under the direction of the Home Army's Intelligence Division. Before describing this effort let us recall the circumstances in which Poland then found herself and the conditions under which the intelligence service was organized.

On 1 September 1939, without declaration of war, Hitler fell upon Poland and from the first day, even the first hour, carried out a ruthless bombing of the whole country, destroying cities and railway stations and even villages and the columns of refugees on the roads. On the seventeenth day of this campaign the Red Army invaded, seizing almost one-third of Poland. German-Russian cooperation was established by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 23 September 1939. After the defeat inflicted by these two great neighboring powers with which she had firm non-aggression pacts, Poland lay stunned and despairing; in the course of her thousand-year history she had survived defeats and partitions, but never on the scale of these in 1939. Yet on the other hand her people were now stronger in number, more conscious of themselves as a nation, and impassioned in their love of country.

What had happened to their fatherland they felt above all as a terrible betrayal, and it is not strange that hatred for the aggressors, particularly the Germans, swelled high in the hearts of all Poles. As early as the fall of 1939 it was apparent that both occupying powers intended to use ruthless measures aimed at the destruction of Poland as a nation. Their first victims were the scientists, university professors, writers, engineers, and political and social leaders. From the Soviet zone Polish residents were deported in mass, under miserable conditions.

The remaining population, including those who escaped from imprisonment, began to organize themselves into an army, primarily for purposes of self-defense. The new organization developed rapidly in central Poland, more slowly on the pe-

ripheries. A central command was created, and then regional and lower commands, including a complement of personnel for collecting information and for maintaining contact among commands, the rudiments of an intelligence and liaison service.

This Polish service, like all such organizations everywhere, was a child of necessity: one had to know where the enemy was and in what strength, what he was doing and intending to do, whether his forces were increasing or diminishing, what dispositions he was making of his men. Since the enemy was in almost every big city, the need for gathering information about him automatically embraced the whole country. This information was utilized immediately by the local secret military authorities and was then transmitted to the highest echelons of command.

The emigre Polish government, located at first in France, moved after the fall of France in the summer of 1940 to London, where it remained to the end of the war, joining forces with the rest of the free world in its struggle with the totalitarian powers. When the home organization crystallized, the emigre government was able to assign it tasks of importance not only for Poland but for the whole allied camp, and its work got briskly under way, with even the lowliest of those employed in gathering information about the enemy aware of the value of their activity.

Positive Intelligence

Intelligence work has a long tradition, and its organization is no less an art than the art of strategy. But it was not after the pattern of classical models that this work was improvised in Poland. The circumstances were altogether exceptional, both extraordinarily hazardous and extraordinarily advantageous. The opportunities were clearly demonstrated when the Germans began to prepare their offensive against the USSR; this was evident to the Home Army intelligence service more than half a year before the attack which came on 22 June 1941. There are few cases in the history of warfare where an intelligence service directed against the enemy has been able to work from inside his military positions, at the very front, behind the front, and far to the rear deep in his homeland.

The Polish service was able to report daily to London on such German preparations as the building of airfields, the gradual

concentration of commands and divisions, and finally their mass movement forward. Before the attack on the USSR occurred, London had ready at hand a plan of the German order of battle, comprising over 100 divisions on the San, Bug and Narew rivers, whereon was marked the position not only of each division but even of the minor units of the huge concentration of forces which was to demolish the Soviet armies in the course of a few weeks' campaign. Never before had a military intelligence service spied out the enemy with tens of thousands of inspired agents, unpaid but devoted patriots, conscious of the purpose of their work.

Organizationally, the Polish service dispensed with the customary distinction between command organs and executive components. The Intelligence Division, constituting one element of the staff of the High Command, functioned less as directing organ for the country-wide network than as the center for correlation and evaluation of reports, transmission of information to London, and receipt of instructions from abroad. It had the following components:

- Chief, with secretariat and communications unit;
- Deputy;

- Area intelligence units, such as for the German Reich, the eastern front, the seacoast and Baltic ports, and a mobile team for special missions;

- Reports Center, subdivided into two sections, the Bureau for Military, Air and Naval Problems, and the Bureau for Economic Problems;

- A Technical and Documentary Services Section;

- A Finance Section, with a unit for the care of arrested personnel and the families of those killed.

For research on complex economic problems the service availed itself of scientists and experts in the various branches of industry who were loosely affiliated with the Bureau for Economic Problems. Such research was done to develop estimates on coal extraction, petroleum yields, synthetic gasoline production, progress in the construction and testing of the new secret weapons (V-1 and V-2), and similar intelligence problems.

Within the German Reich the mission of the service was not defined by geographical area, but concentrated on certain sea-port and industrial objectives designated by higher authority.

For this purpose several dozen specialists in naval and air problems were sent from London. Poles were employed in the most variegated positions in many German establishments, ranging from railroads to business houses, and so had widespread opportunities for making observations. Reports often reached the intelligence center from several different sources at the same time, facilitating evaluation of the reliability of incoming material.

The required penetration of the North Sea ports met with a great deal of difficulty on account of the severe screening process the Germans used in taking on workers there and the alert activity of German counterintelligence. In this sector the work of the intelligence service was subject to frequent interruption. The Baltic ports, on the other hand, remained under uninterrupted control.

The rear areas of the eastern front were unevenly controlled. Only the Ukrainian sector was kept thoroughly in hand. In the whole stretch south from Polesia there was a regular agent network. Intelligence teams advanced in the wake of the German armies, reaching as far as the Volga and the Caucasus. The intelligence reports from this sector were complete and gave a clear picture of the state of the German ground and air forces and of their economic exploitation of occupied territory.

The Reports Center organized and correlated the information received, checked its validity by various methods, and prepared *ad hoc* and weekly reports. These reports sent abroad presented a synthesis of the current situation, particularly on the eastern front. Another important product of the intelligence activity were studies of the German tables of organization and equipment; these constituted a useful training aid for the Home Army.

After diplomatic relations were established between the Polish emigre government and the USSR and a Polish military mission had arrived in Moscow in 1941, the Soviet authorities proposed collaboration with the Polish intelligence services. The proposal envisioned direct transmission of information reports from Poland to the Soviet staff through the establishment of radio and air courier communications between Warsaw and the Soviet intelligence center. The Poles accepted only the proposed radio link. A Polish liaison post was thus actually established near Moscow on 2 April 1942, but for various

reasons it continued to function only until July 1942. This was the period when the Polish divisions which had been forming in the USSR were evacuated to Iran. One of the reasons why the collaboration was broken off was that the Russians did not give the Poles the certifications which they had promised.

Communications between Warsaw and London were maintained by radio and by courier. The most urgent reports on military, air, naval and economic subjects were transmitted coded by direct radio. The number of such reports reached 300 per month. Less urgent reports were forwarded, also enciphered, to the base in Budapest and relayed to bases in Switzerland and Sweden, whence they were transmitted by radio to London. Reports by courier were made once a month beginning in 1941; these were compendious, comprising the entirety of the elaborated information organized according to London's instructions. To each section were attached the pertinent original documents, such as construction blueprints or plans of industrial installations and airfields. These reports, amounting generally to some 200 typewritten pages with 100 pages of attachments, were microfilmed and packed in safe containers.

Certain Polish achievements had special significance for the general war effort. In the spring of 1943, for example, the home intelligence service received information that the Germans were carrying out tests of some new secret weapon at their experimental station in Peenemünde. London ordered the service to get a detailed plan of the station, and one was obtained within a couple of weeks. With this plan for guidance, the Royal Air Force was able to carry out on the night of 17-18 August 1943 a raid in which part of the station was destroyed and the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, General Jeschonek, was killed along with several members of the experimental team. As a result the "V" rockets which were being tested at Peenemünde were several months late getting into operation.

In the spring of 1944 the Germans transferred their experimental activity to Polish soil. Rockets shot from launching ramps at the SS training camp in Blizna-Pustków near Mielec would at first hit widely scattered points over a range of several hundred kilometers. As the experiments progressed, however,

the hits became concentrated in the neighborhood of Sarnaka on the Bug, north of Wyszków. A special agent network established by the Polish service for that purpose kept each shot under observation, recording meteorological and ballistic data and other details of the operation. Other teams collected fragments and component parts of the rockets after they fell, getting there ahead of the German motorized patrols sent out to find the pieces. A commission of engineers, assembled in Warsaw for this sole purpose, undertook research on the characteristics of the new weapon. Its characteristics were reported immediately to London as they were identified; and later, after assembly of all the most important components of a rocket, when photographs and technical drawings of the fragments had been made, the whole thing was forwarded by air to London, together with the results of the commission's research.

The intelligence collection operations were conducted on Polish territory by the regional commands. The organization of the intelligence components of regional staffs was modeled on that given above for the Intelligence Division of the High Command. The agent networks, employing thousands of people in each region, were responsible to the regional commanders. The regional commands utilized the resulting information in formulating their own security and war plans in addition to forwarding it to the High Command for study of the enemy dispositions as a whole. The tasks of the service were to develop and report information on: a) the German garrisons, army and police, airfields, military stores, repair shops, army transport, equipment and materiel, with special attention to fuel supplies, along all communication routes to and from the front; b) the transfer of units, changes in their billeting, and the smallest particulars of their conduct; c) the operations of industry in every detail.

Agents of the service reported every observed change not only in the disposition of the German units but also in their daily life. The service took full advantage of the help of the civilian population unconnected with the military organization. In time, as resistance became the established attitude in the civilian community, people spontaneously reported the most minute observations in every sphere of activity. They automatically reinforced the network in areas made particularly important by events and in periods pregnant with military

developments like June 1941 and the time of the German retreat through Poland.

The results of the work created a detailed and frequently colorful picture of the situation; in particular, information on industry, more difficult to obtain than purely military information, was imposing in its breadth and precision. New orders and the time of starting new production led to inferences about the plans of the occupying power. The effects of each bombing on the production of the industrial establishment were reported, and the selection of future targets was made on the basis of these reports rather than on the evidence of air photographs at the time of bombardment, which told only a part of the story.

Counterintelligence Activities

If the organization of positive intelligence activities was a departure from classical forms, counterintelligence was even more exclusively based on its own ingenuity and the adaptation of its organization and work to local needs. It was never directed centrally from the top; initial attempts to form a country-wide organization modeled after the unit in the High Command turned out rather badly, and day-to-day practical activity demanded complete autonomy for regional counterintelligence units. There was mutual sharing of information only on Polish collaborators with the Gestapo.

This part of the work is more difficult than intelligence proper. It requires the employment of outstandingly intelligent people and the application of more highly perfected techniques; it requires individual enterprise and excellent internal liaison. In an enemy-occupied country counterintelligence can operate only when the whole mechanism of conspiratorial activity begins to operate flawlessly; and the construction and operation of such a mechanism cannot be treated in this article.

The effectiveness of the Polish counterintelligence can be measured by the security of the secret high political and military authorities in Warsaw, their capital. The Germans never succeeded in developing information on the Polish military organization, as witness Von dem Bach's testimony at the Nuremberg trials. Bach was the German commander during the two-month Battle of Warsaw, whose mission it was to destroy the Polish units in the uprising. Before he took over

the Warsaw command he had had access to the files of the German intelligence service. Yet he testified in 1945 that there was no single commander on the Polish side who could be considered his own opposite number. Thus he was in error not only at the time of the battle but even a year afterward; he had no idea whatever of the organization and deployment of the Polish forces. That is proof that the Polish counterintelligence effort against enemy penetration was above normal standards. The fact that the Germans were better acquainted with the command structure of the Home Army than with its Warsaw regional command, which prepared and directed the uprising, is a function of special circumstances.

The Germans likewise never succeeded, in the course of this battle or at any other time during their entire occupation of Polish soil, in getting the key to the Polish cipher. That is the only way they could have got information about the military organization and its functioning. Today, when the cards are long since all on the table, any assertion to the contrary would be invalid.

The mission of counterintelligence is simple to define; it is charged with learning in advance what measures are planned against the secret organization by the adversary, in this case the German secret police, security police, and military and administrative authorities. It often happened that this kind of information was derived from the questions the Germans put to persons arrested and imprisoned in the local jails; it could be obtained immediately after the prisoner was taken to his cell, and in the early period was the principal source of guidance for the Polish dispositions.

It must be emphasized in this connection that the secret organization was threatened not only by the danger of compromising its command structure, its leading personalities, its communications or the operations of its secret press, but by every shift and resettlement of area populations, which often ruptured its organizational links and threw to the winds the exertions of many months' work.

The regional counterintelligence organizations were made up of the following elements:

- Directing organ, subordinate to the regional command;
- Several observation groups working independently of each other;

Behind Enemy Lines

A headquarters operation to correlate and evaluate the material sent in by the observation groups, to do research on German penetration techniques, and to supply material to the director of the Special Court;

Collaborators in the prisons;

A liaison unit;

An administrative unit; and

Groups for the liquidation of traitors.

The counterintelligence organization never effectively extended its work into the concentration camps and never got its people into the German secret police organs; it didn't have the financial resources to effect such penetrations. That does not mean, however, that it didn't get information, and valuable information, from these sources without the employment of regular agents there.

Next after the interrogation of arrested persons, the best source of counterintelligence information was developed in the off-duty hangouts of the Germans, their restaurants, coffee shops and private homes. The Germans were permitted to visit only the public places reserved "*Nur für Deutsche*," and the Polish service had to introduce its own people into these places. It became customary there for the Germans to grow garrulous, certain that they were among their own people whom they could trust, and to talk openly about all kinds of things. Thus information was obtained about whom they might suspect under what pseudonym, whether and when they were planning "grabs,"¹ resettlements, or round-ups for work in the Reich, which public houses, districts and dwellings were under observation, and the like.

The Polish commanders also got from their counterintelligence workers data on the behavior of their own service personnel, on whether they were observing in every respect the carefully worked-out principles of conspiratorial activity. Violations such as garrulousness, frequenting public places, and

¹ The Germans staged mass raids in the larger cities and on the railroads; since other methods were unsuccessful they calculated that in these mass grabs some individuals active in the secret organizations would by the laws of probability fall into their hands. After each grab there was a cursory interrogation followed by a detailed one. Often individuals were released immediately.

group excursions of young people out of town were censured at hearings, and those so censured were demoted to the lowest ranks of the organization. Considering, however, that organization personnel were selected for their high patriotism and trustworthiness, counterintelligence had little work in this field; there was no question of continuing investigation or uncertainty about their moral caliber.

One sensitive segment of the Home Army's work required special precautions—the production of weapons like hand grenades, incendiary flares, automatic pistols, etc. Those who worked constantly in this sector usually began after a time to disregard security considerations, and it was necessary to put these places under counterintelligence protection in addition to the regular security guards assigned to all places where production or secret printing was going on.

In extreme cases of danger to the secret organization, when there was no other way to avoid losses, the commander would order an attack on the German units. Such attacks were carried out by combat units of the so-called diversionary forces held in constant readiness, well armed and thirsting for revenge.

If one may draw morals from this Polish story, there are three of them here. One, that it is possible to accomplish a great deal without money and under difficult conditions, if only some high purpose inspires those at work. Two, that collaboration with allies gives one the necessary confidence that he is contributing to a broad effective effort. Three, that resistance and intelligence activity take on significance proportionate to the sensitivity of their locale with respect to the enemy's military positions: Poland was more important than France in World War II in relation to German communications, the rear areas of the front, and staging for strategic action.

A NEGLECTED SOURCE OF EVIDENCE

The profound changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union in the five years since Stalin's death have been accompanied by many surprising events. It is useful to consider certain means by which Western observers might have reduced the element of surprise.

Some events, such as the arrest of Beria, happened so suddenly that they probably surprised important groups within the Soviet leadership. Sometimes the outcome of protracted conflicts among the leaders probably could not have been predicted long in advance even by the protagonists themselves. But frequently Western observers have learned of the *existence* of such conflicts only when Moscow announced their outcome. Such an instance was Malenkov's resignation as head of the government, in February 1955, and Khrushchev's nomination of Bulganin to succeed him. Need this event have caused astonishment? Were the Soviet leaders really able to stake their political careers, if not their lives, in factional struggle without leaving evident traces of their mutual opposition?

Actually there was clear evidence of the contention which issued in Malenkov's resignation, and other surprising events as well might have been anticipated by examining the traces left by the contending leaders. These traces lie principally in published texts whose surface meaning does not reveal their political significance. They are "esoteric communications," hidden messages, which enable factional leaders to communicate quickly, safely, and decisively with the sub-elites whose support they solicit.¹

Serious students of the Soviet Union, aware that esoteric communications play some role in Soviet politics, scrutinize Soviet publications for hidden messages and try to elicit their meaning. On the other side, Soviet leaders and publicists employ their ingenuity to screen such messages from eyes for which they are not intended. That they have succeeded rather well is indicated by the surprise with which the world has greeted a number of events announced from Moscow.

¹ The role of esoteric communication in Soviet politics is discussed at some length in *The Rise of Khrushchev*, pp. 88-94.

An important reason for their success is that Western observers underestimate the refinement and subtlety of Soviet esoteric communications. Only the most obtrusive messages, designed for a wide Soviet audience, are generally noted. Let Beria not attend an opera with his Presidium colleagues and even our morning newspaper will ponder his fate. But let Khrushchev's party title of *pervi sekretar* (first secretary) become *Pervi sekretar*, and, though hundreds of copies of *Pravda* are read in the West for signs of Khrushchev's status, the change may go unnoticed.

The first impulse of one unaccustomed to take such minute variations seriously is revulsion as from a kind of talmudism. The Soviet politicians and publicists do engage in a kind of talmudism, probably not learned from studying the Talmud but absorbed from their political environment. The tradition of esoteric communication developed early in the Soviet regime, being a direct offspring of bolshevik practices in evading the czarist censorship. Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov have been officially designated talmudists; Khrushchev, be it noted, deserves this epithet as much as they. So to be a talmudist is to be in good company if one's purpose is to understand Soviet politics. At any rate it is a fact, talmudic or not, that the Central Committee of the CPSU elected Khrushchev first secretary in 1953 and *First* secretary in 1956; and this fact must either be explained or accepted without interpretation.

Facts which are accepted without interpretation—especially seemingly trivial facts like the capitalization of an initial letter—have little value. They acquire value when they are explained, and only in the degree that the explanation has political significance. Besides, some facts are so egregious that they *demand* to be explained. And if one's business is the serious and difficult one of trying to analyze Soviet politics with insufficient facts, can one disregard so intriguing a fact as *Pravda's* decision in 1955 to capitalize the initial letter in Khrushchev's party title?

In this case it is probably the enormity of the explanation which causes the student of the USSR to balk. The disproportion between the minuteness of the evidence—*pervi* changed to *Pervi*—and the conclusion drawn from it in my book—that the change magnified the authority of the senior secretary—could hardly be greater. Yet one cannot reject the in-

ference out of hand, since Khrushchev's authority rose appreciably in the months after *Pravda* introduced the change, in May 1955; and it is difficult to dismiss the symbolic change as trivial, since it was subsequently confirmed by an action of the Central Committee.²

One of my experiences as I was preparing material for *The Rise of Khrushchev* may illustrate why I take such apparently inconsequential changes seriously.

On November 3, 1955, the Soviet press published a telegram from a New Zealand official, Holyoake, which wrongly addressed Khrushchev by Stalin's title of "general secretary." Not Holyoake's mistake, but the Soviet publicity for it, suggested that Khrushchev might be making a bold bid for Stalin's old title, and therefore for the powers which had been associated with it. I decided to test this hypothesis by examining the evidence more closely, at the same time investigating the general proposition that minute symbolic changes bearing on sensitive political questions embody hidden messages, and can therefore be made to yield important evidence about the Soviet leadership. A few weeks of research led to a series of discoveries:

(1) When I examined Stalin's obituaries to see how they treated his famous title of general secretary, I was surprised to learn that they did not even mention it.

(2) Further investigation showed that Soviet newspapers had not mentioned the title of party general secretary once in the two-and-a-half years from Stalin's death until the Holyoake telegram.

(3) The articles on Stalin in Soviet reference works published since his death disagreed remarkably as to whether Stalin had remained general secretary until his death in 1953 or had abandoned the post in October, 1952.

² It is noteworthy that in discussing my book in the last issue of this journal the reviewer evades this difficulty through an inadvertence. In treating this evidence he grows inattentive and misrepresents the conclusion which was drawn from it. According to the review: "Initially [Khrushchev] was designated 'first secretary,' then 'First Secretary,' and finally 'First secretary,' all of this purportedly reflecting the ups and downs of his political fortunes." The book, however, does not infer ups and downs but only two rises in his power; the form First Secretary was used only twice, a few days apart.

(4) A few weeks after publication of the Holyoake telegram which initiated this research, the journal *Kommunist* mentioned, for the first time since Stalin's death, his incumbency as general secretary.

(5) Further attention to Khrushchev's official party title developed the minute fact which we have been using as an illustration, that just a few months previous to publication of the Holyoake telegram *Pravda* had changed Khrushchev's title by capitalizing its initial letter.

All of these discoveries, it will be noted, involve unobtrusive facts which are pregnant with political symbolism. They belong to a world of meaning which is largely closed to the ordinary reader of Soviet publications. To detect the most elusive of these symbolic facts a reader must anticipate them. He must expect to find something relevant to the object of his inquiry, although not necessarily the particular discovery which actually turns up. It follows that a Soviet specialist ought not simply to sit by the stream of Soviet communications and hope to fish out their hidden messages; he must cast into it at confluences where he believes a hidden message lies concealed. One is led to these confluences by reflection founded in knowledge of Soviet politics and an understanding of the current situation.

A pregnant symbolic fact may provide the stimulus to such reflection. One symbolic fact leads to another. That is why, when we stumble upon such a fact, we should not accept it uninterpreted, but ought to pursue its explanation. The first step in the pursuit, however, is not a frenzied search for more symbolic facts; it is rather to explain by means of a hypothesis the one we already have. Once the hypothesis is articulated, deductions can be drawn from it in order to test it. In order to form fruitful hypotheses and to make verifiable deductions from them, an assessment of the political situation is required.³

³ Without making some assessment of the political situation it is logically impossible to draw any inference from symbolic evidence; one cannot draw *valid* inferences without taking account of the many complex factors which influence Soviet developments. It is an error, then, to suppose that there is a method (the reviewer chooses to call it "content analysis") which makes it possible for inferences to be developed independently from the symbols and then "placed side by side with inferences developed by other means."

To illustrate the process of reflection set off by a suggestive symbolic fact, let us return to the telegram addressing Khrushchev as general secretary. The hypothesis set up to explain its publication is that Khrushchev used Holyoake's error in his effort to acquire Stalin's old office and the powers associated with it. From this hypothesis one can deduce the following: (1) Stalin's famous office of party general secretary was probably a highly sensitive topic at the time of his death and afterward; (2) Khrushchev's title as the senior secretary in the party Secretariat must have been even more sensitive. These deductions suggest where to look for hidden messages as well as what kind to expect.

One test of the validity of a hypothesis is its capacity to bring the researcher to important new evidence. If the search resulting from these deductions had disclosed nothing of political import—if Stalin's title of general secretary had been treated after his death in the same way as before, and if Khrushchev's party title had not been tampered with—then the hypothesis from which they were derived would have become less credible. Instead, by leading to the discovery of important political facts, the hypothesis gained a measure of confirmation. These discoveries also lent credence to the general thesis under examination, that esoteric communications play a key role in Soviet politics.

Another, and in some ways a better, test of a hypothesis is whether subsequent events support it, and particularly whether predictions deduced from it are confirmed. The predictions deduced from my interpretation of the Holyoake telegram and related evidence were, in my opinion, largely substantiated by subsequent events, including some which have followed publication of *The Rise of Khrushchev*. Khrushchev's assumption of the premiership in March 1958, for example, provides further evidence of his boundless ambition and his continuing need for *authority* as well as power. Moreover, the manner in which he has chosen to juxtapose his party and government titles is congruent with his personal strategy as the book reconstructs it. While the previous joint holders of the top party and government posts, Stalin and Malenkov, were designated "Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Secretary of the Central Committee," Khrushchev has reversed the order. By thus subordinating his government to his party office he has

displayed his continuing concern to maintain the supremacy of the party apparatus. Again, his distinctive party title remains an important symbol of his special position: while Soviet publications usually referred to Stalin as "secretary," not "*general* secretary," they designate Khrushchev "*First* secretary."

The evidence that Soviet leaders commonly employ esoteric communications seems conclusive, however strange the practice may appear to Western observers. Men whose understanding of political reality has been formed by a free society find it difficult to suppose that piddling with stereotyped formulas can be an important mode of political behavior for powerful leaders. Even in default of the customary data used in political analysis, they are understandably reluctant to accept far-reaching conclusions drawn from this elusive evidence. Yet the fact remains: these minutiae—no less than purges and policy debates—are the very stuff of Soviet politics. The frequency of esoteric communications, and the ends served by them, may vary widely. But they will remain a necessary link between leaders and followers until such time as men are allowed to go openly into the Soviet political arena to seek support for their views. When politics, in this sense, ceases to be "anti-party" activity, the Soviet political system will have become something different from what Stalin made it, and what it remains today.

If esoteric communications play this vital role, then studying them should enable us to extend our knowledge of Soviet politics. Two questions arise in connection with such studies: what kinds of knowledge can they provide, and how should they be conducted?

The particular knowledge which can be obtained necessarily depends upon the content of the hidden messages which can be uncovered. In recent years, when factional conflict has permeated Soviet politics under cover of "collective leadership," hidden messages have chiefly served factional ends. But this has not always been true. In Stalin's last years, for example, although contending subordinate leaders used their limited access to publications for factional purposes, the most important esoteric communications were the dictator's programmatic pronouncements, which he delivered in an appropriately oracular style. Thus it should not be supposed that esoteric

communications can be made to yield conclusions only about dissension among the leaders: important information on other intelligence problems can also be derived from them.

Until now, Soviet specialists have for the most part limited their search for hidden messages to *current* Soviet publications, hoping to find there clues to future developments. However, the uses of esoteric communication in research are not limited to short-run predictions.⁴ Retrospective examination of Soviet publications in the light of subsequent events frequently reveals hidden messages which eluded contemporary investigation. Such esoteric communications, when considered in the light of the events which they helped bring about, can enhance our understanding of the situation in which they appeared. By such means, for example, the use of key institutions as power bases by contending leaders during the Stalin succession crisis might be considerably illuminated.

The second question which arises regarding studies of esoteric communication is how they should be conducted. The researcher who makes extensive use of symbolic evidence adopts special procedures, develops uncommon skills, and accumulates abundant data. These can usefully be passed on to researchers who have had less experience in using such evidence. But such by-products of specialization should not be cultivated and exaggerated so as to produce a "methodology" to be set alongside other "methodologies." Esoteric communications are simply one kind of evidence to be woven in with other data in analyzing Soviet politics. The rigorous and exhaustive analysis of such minutiae can produce significant results only if the researcher maintains a broad political outlook and considers other relevant evidence in arriving at his conclusions.

If, as we have emphasized, an assessment of the political situation enters into every inference drawn from symbolic facts, how can an evaluator engaged in making a departmental or national estimate take such inferences into account unless he fully shares the specialist's estimate of the political situation? All that is required is that the specialist's inference be fitted into the evaluator's estimate of the political situation. This fitting-in may make necessary some modification of the

⁴ An important historical study based on such evidence is *The Ritual of Liquidation*, by N. Leites and E. Bernaut.

evaluator's earlier views, and therein lies the specialist's contribution to finished intelligence. Few of our beliefs about the current Soviet political situation are so firmly based that they cannot benefit from new evidence.

To illustrate, imagine that a specialist skilled in the interpretation of symbolic evidence brings this Holyoake telegram to the generalist evaluator in December 1955. The specialist, having analyzed the telegram and related symbolic evidence in the light of his concept of Soviet politics and of the particular situation in late 1955, has concluded that Khrushchev is actively engaged in destroying the collective leadership. After being presented with this conclusion and with the argument on which it is based, the evaluator, who may believe that Khrushchev is satisfied to act simply as the spokesman for a collective leadership, must set these views against his own. He must then inquire into the grounds for his own belief: it has been reported that Khrushchev's colleagues show him no special deference in the presence of Western officials; Soviet propaganda extols collective leadership and criticizes the "cult of the individual"; Khrushchev lacks a dictator's bearing and self-control; and so forth.

Are these grounds adequate to maintain the view that Khrushchev's power and ambitions are no threat to collective leadership, despite the symbolic evidence which has been interpreted to support the opposite view? The evaluator may believe so; but he ought not simply to dismiss the symbolic facts which have been brought to his attention. If he rejects the specialist's explanation of them, he should try himself to provide an interpretation which is not inconsistent with his estimate of Khrushchev's political position. His explanation of the symbolic evidence must be a plausible one, as the specialist's is. If he is unable to develop such an interpretation, the evaluator should recognize that his estimate has become less credible. He must be prepared to alter it if subsequent events (e.g., Khrushchev's secret speech) cast fresh doubt upon it.

By this or some similar procedure the researches of "talmudists," as of Soviet specialists generally, can be more widely exploited by those who must estimate future political developments in the U.S.S.R. These researches can provide new evidence on important problems; they can bring plausible hypotheses to areas of admitted ignorance; they can raise pro-

~~A Neglected Source of Evidence~~

vocative objections to views held uncritically. More generally, in minds which have not been closed to their influence, they can stimulate reflection about the very nature of the Soviet political system.

WE SPIED . . .

The past months have been rather lean ones for first-class books on intelligence, but we have spied out a few which certainly should be called to your attention.

Resistance

Two excellent books on the French Resistance during World War II and one on resistance in Italy have been added to the literature in this field. *The Story of the Italian Resistance*, by Roberto Battaglia, will be reviewed in a later issue of the *Studies*. Here we especially commend for good reading *They Fought Alone: The Story of British Agents in France*, by Maurice Buckmaster.¹ Col. Buckmaster, who headed the French section of the British Special Operations Executive, had already written one excellent book on S. O. E. activities in France,² and his new one is no less well done. *They Fought Alone* relates the activities of British S. O. E. agents dropped into France, describes their successes and their failures, and tells how they organized their nets. For the period after D-Day, it shows how countless German troops were immobilized by the activities of the S. O. E.-led Maquis, by sabotage, the destruction of bridges and rolling stock, and other means. With pride the author quotes General Eisenhower's affirmation that the operations of the S. O. E. and the Maquis had shortened the war in Europe by nine months. The book covers many aspects of tradecraft: personnel recruiting and training, communications, documentation, sabotage, escape and evasion, security. Col. Buckmaster can write on these topics with authority, and he writes interestingly and well.

Ten Thousand Eyes, by Richard Collier,³ is devoted to the activities of those Resistance agent nets under the control of

¹ London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1958. 256 p. 18s

² *Specially Employed: The Story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance*. London: The Batchworth Press, 1952. 200 p.

³ London: Collins, 1958. 320 p. 18s. Also New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958. 320 p. \$4.00.

We Spied

General de Gaulle's Free French Headquarters in London which were primarily engaged in securing intelligence on Hitler's Atlantic Wall from Cherbourg to Le Havre, where the D-Day landings were to be made. The author tells how in 1940 Capt. Andre Dewavrin escaped from France and joined General de Gaulle in London, where he established the Free French intelligence set-up and became known to the Resistance as Colonel Passy. For Colonel Passy's own story, one should refer to his three volumes of *Souvenirs*.⁴

Ten Thousand Eyes also gives the story of some of Dewavrin's liaison with Gilbert Renault-Roulier, known throughout the French Resistance as Rémy, who has described his own Resistance activities in five volumes, two of which have been translated into English.⁵ Among the many tradecraft subjects treated in *Ten Thousand Eyes* are the establishment of agent nets, communications, air/maritime support of agent personnel, and escape and evasion. Primarily, however, the book deals with the clandestine collection of intelligence information on beach and inland defenses which was essential to the planners of the invasion and the invasion forces themselves. London needed this information in minute detail, and it was up to the Resistance to collect it. *Ten Thousand Eyes* tells how the members of the Resistance would sketch this information in on sector maps and pass it on to their cartographic service, run by an ex-mechanic in Caen. There the information was consolidated on master maps to be sent on to England. Spine-tingling stories of how this information was secured make the book a fascinating one.

Intelligence in Psychological Warfare

A *Psychological Warfare Casebook*, compiled by William E. Daugherty in collaboration with Morris Janowitz,⁶ was published just in time for this column to review its intelligence aspects. Daugherty is an operations analyst with the Johns Hop-

⁴ *2^e Bureau Londres*. Monte-Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947. 236 p.
10, Duke Street Londres. Monte-Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947. 387 p.
Missions Secrètes En France. Paris: Plon, 1951. 439 p.

⁵ *Memoirs of a Secret Agent of Free France*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. 406 p.
Courage and Fear. London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1950. 320 p.

⁶ Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 880 p. \$12.50.

kins Operations Research Office, which usually performs its functions under contract with the Department of the Army, and Dr. Janowitz is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan. Both of them saw intelligence service during World War II. Their voluminous work — almost 900 pages — is exactly what its title implies, a casebook; the compiler/editors are introducing into the psychological warfare field the casebook method long used as a method of instruction in the law schools.

The editors define psychological warfare as “the *planned* use of *propaganda* and *other actions* designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, and friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.” In addition to treating the policy, doctrine, organization, objectives, and methods of psychological warfare, they include chapters on the role of intelligence, research, and analysis, on evaluation of effectiveness, and on Soviet psychological warfare. At the end of each of the 10 chapters there are lists of references and additional collateral reading, constituting in aggregate an excellent basic psychological warfare bibliography. Each chapter consists of articles or extracts on its subject by various authors or by the editors themselves. The editors have been able to cull through many official files, and some of the material comes from unpublished manuscripts or reports. This work, which was several years in preparation, appears to be not only an indispensable tool for the beginner in psychological warfare and a good refresher and reference work for the expert, but also a source for the study of how intelligence impinges on this field. It does, however, have the shortcoming of being too much concerned with the military aspects of psychological warfare and slighting its non-military role in the cold war.

This reviewer believes that the casebook method has much to commend it for use in more than one field of intelligence. Some day such a casebook might well be published on aspects of the collection and production of intelligence and in such specialized fields as escape and evasion. A serious gap in intelligence literature would then be filled.

Brief Mention

Here are some other books on various aspects of intelligence which should be called briefly to your attention:

BROME, Vincent. *The Way Back*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958. 249 p. \$3.75. Also London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1957. 267 p.

This is the story of Dr. Albert Guérisset, a doctor in the Belgian Army who escaped to England after the fall of France in 1940. Under the pseudonym of Pat O'Leary he was returned to the south of France to work for British intelligence, transporting out of Europe those British airmen who had been shot down and had evaded or escaped confinement.

BROWN, Ralph S., Jr. *Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958. 524 p. \$6.00.

Professor Brown here reviews the security programs for screening civil servants — federal, state, and local — as well as loyalty tests administered by private employers and labor unions, and recommends improvements. Although this is probably the best book to date on this subject by an author not connected with the government, it still lacks the objectivity and competence which characterized the 1956 report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York⁷ and the 1957 report of the President's Commission on Government Security.⁸

COWLES, Virginia. *The Phantom Major*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 320 p. \$3.95. Also London: Collins, 1958.

Virginia Cowles was a war correspondent for the *London Sunday Times* who covered the North African campaign. This book tells the story of David Stirling and his Special Air Service unit which operated behind Rommel's lines in North Africa. Stirling was finally captured and imprisoned at Colditz.

⁷ New York: Dodd, Mead, 1956. 301 p.

⁸ Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957. 807 p.

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